No. 833 / Aug. 5, 2001
@The LDP Victory is the Beginning of its Dissolution
The Deepening Dilemma of Koizumfs Political Line
The Paralysis of the
Government and LDP
@Editorial:
The Counterattack of the LDPfsgConservative Wingh
The Limits of Koizumifs Politics are Revealed
@The
Election of Candidates Resisting Reform:
Taking Advantage of
Koizumifs gPopularityh
@Workers and the Upper House Election: Special Reports
From
Tokyo,
Osaka, Kanegawa, Shizuoka, & Hyogo,
@The Election of the gWeakesth LDP
Candidates
@@@@@@@@@@and@The Decline of the JCP (in Osaka)
@Series: The Privatization of the Postal
Service
What
Lies Behind This Scheme (#7)
@Book Review: A Depiction of the
Beginning of the gPostwarh Period
A
Review of John Dowerfs
Embracing Defeat
@Notes on the Struggles Against
the New History Textbook
In the Kunitachi and Suginami Wards of Tokyo
From the article of 'Petrel'
No.833 / Aug 5, 2001
The LDP Victory is the
Beginning of its Dissolution
The Deepening Dilemma of Koizumi's
Political Line
The Paralysis of the Government and LDP
-------------------------
The LDP was victorious in the election, but this was a gstrangeh
victory in which the LDP is bewildered rather than being drunk with a sense of triumph.
While the LDP achieved victory by raising the banner of gstructural reform,h the party
totally lacks the will, structure, policies, or outlook to carrying out these reforms. The
bulk of the LDP doesnft believe in gstructural reform,h and some are even waiting
for the chance to bury gKoizumifs reforms.h
-------------------------
The Dilemma of Koizumifs Victory
The victory of Koizumi presents a dilemma. During the election campaign, Koizumi repeatedly said that he would firmly push forward greforms,h and if the LDP opposed this, then he would break up the party and create a new LDP.
However, since Koizumi was in fact fighting in the election for the sake of the LDP, this claim is deceitful. Koizumi in fact has no desire or clear basis to gchange the LDP.h
According to Koizumifs confused reasoning, since any LDP candidates opposed to his greformisth line would be rejected by the people and soundly defeated in the election, the gforces of resistanceh [to reform] within the party would have no choice but to fall in line. But the reactionaries within in the LDP with a strong vested interest in the status quo cannot be dealt with so easily.
Koizumif has made remarks that reveal an overconfident belief that his individual gpopularityh and greformisth line will continue indefinitely, but nothing could be less reliable than individual gpopularity.h
No one can guarantee that Koizuimifs popularity and the support for greformh can be maintained when the severity of the recession and the gpainh he has spoken of becomes clear.
If the recession gets worse--even if the greforms are postponed--it will be clear as day that there will be pressure to seek some relief and economic recovery; if Koizumi gresistsh this he will represent the gforce of resistanceh and will likely be thrown out of power (just as former prime minister Hashimoto was only recently).
On top of this, the order of Koizumifs approach is totally backward. Koizumi says that he would break up the LDP if it opposed greform,h but in this case why hasnft he already broken up the LDP--which has been opposed greformh--and formed a new coalition of political forces in favor of greformh to gear up for the election in order to form a majority in the government? Only in this way, would the obtaining of power have been the definite premise for greform.h
Koizumi, however, is very much a Liberal Democrat. As a representative of the faction that steadily supported Prime Minister Morifs government, he is firmly within the LDP power structure. There is no reason that such a person would champion the dissolution of the party.
If Koizumi possessed the courage to break up the LDP, from the very beginning he would have done so. He would have strived to at least replace a large number of candidates, or eliminate the names of candidates tied vested interests from the list of proportional districts.
Of course, however, Koizumi did not even lift a finger to do this. Koizumi has said that among the opposition parties gthere are those who say that they support my line and are willing to cooperate to a certain extent.h But if this is the case, it would be logical for Koizumi to break off ties with the gforces of resistance,h and rally the political forces opposed to them, rather than engaging in a feud within the LDP.
The actual outcome of Koizumifs approach will be the expansion of the gforces of resistance,h led by the Hashimoto faction, under the slogan of greform.h This is the irony of the election. If this election had been held under the Mori government, a large number of these LDP politicians would have been unable to even participate, and in this sense no one has rendered a greater service to the candidates with vested interests than Koizumi himself.
Koizumi was victorious in the election, but there is opposition to Koizumi throughout the LDP, and this has only grown stronger as a result of the election. This is Koizumifs dilemma that we have referred to.
The Predicament of Koizumifs Economic PoliciesKoizumifs greformsh will also be unable to relieve the worsening economic difficulties. Even in the election campaign, it was openly declared that the economy would worsen and there would be a gSeptember crisis.h If the economic situation does worsen, there a loud chorus demanding economic stimulus will be heard within the LDP, and gpublic opinionh will quickly turn its back on Koizumifs gphilosophyh of genduring pain.h
But rather than such ineffectual gphilosophies,h real-life interests and displays of practical ability are more significant--and have always been so.
For instance, former Prime Minister Hashimoto was unable to respond to the gfinancial crisish in the wake of the bank collapses, and only talked about financial reconstruction, and was thus removed from office under the overwhelming criticism within the LDP from those voices demanding business stimulus. There is no guarantee that Koizumi will not meet the same fate.
This is similar to the situation when Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi (1870-1931) rose to power in 1929 on the wave of the chorus calling for gsubstantial reformh The great popularity he enjoyed when he took office disappeared in less than two years in the midst of the worsening recession. The voices of praise and expectation suddenly turned into complaints and curses.
There is little doubt that Koizumifs cabinet will sit on their hands as the recession worsens. However, since Koizumi has already attacked the gtraditionalh economic policies and called for gstructural reformh--saying that economic recovery is impossible without this--what other means does he have left?
Conversely, if Koizumi does in fact try to literally realize his slogan that geconomic recovery is impossible without structural reform,h while the economic situation not only remains dismal but in fact worsens, there is no guarantee against economic collapse and a panic.
If Koizumi wavers somewhere in the middle of economic stimulus policies and structural reform, there is little doubt that his popularity will disintegrate. Thus, the LDP will find itself stuck in a blind alley where they are unable to move in either direction.
The Strange Proportional Election DistrictsThe drawbacks of the new election system were also exposed in the recent election. In particular, this revealed that the new reform in the proportional election that allowed voters to write down either an individual candidatefs name or the name of the political party on the ballot is a terrible system that only serves the interests of the vested interests within the LDP.
That is, the majority of the votes from people supporting Koizumi who wrote down the name of the LDP on the ballet, in fact mainly benefited these gvested interesth politicians who depend on special interest groups and government agencies, and are able to rack up votes through gmachine politics.h
If there were a system of voting only for candidates names (old system) most of these politicians would have been defeated. Under such a system, the amount of votes the gvested interesth politicians received in the election wouldnft have been nearly enough for them to be elected. For example, even the LDP candidate--representing the postal department--who received the most votes only received about half of the one million votes that would have been needed to be elected. Even more pathetic was the performance of some gconservativeh candidates affiliated with gbusinessh circles (some of them only received twenty or thirty thousand votes).
Regardless of how ridiculous were the gvested interesth candidates supported by the Construction, Agricultural, Postal Service Ministries or Physicians Association, they were able to accumulate votes given to the LDP and thereby get elected. Of these votes given to the LDP, there were many that were cast in opposition to these very gvested interesth candidates and in favor of Koizumifs greforms.h
This new election system is also to blame for the large number of celebrities that participated in the recent election. These people are completely incompetent in terms of politics, and also know nothing about education (a professional wrestler said that he would gcontribute to the problem of educationh if elected, but his only educational idea or policy is the C-student idea of enforcing discipline and gmoral educationh).
In short, the election system has not been improved, but rather degenerated to better serve the interests of gvested interestsh within the LDP.
The Defeat of the gConservativeh Social Democratic and Communist Parties In the midst of the chorus calling for greform,h the SDP and JCP suffered a big defeat. This is because these parties were in solidarity with gconservativeh elements within the LDP, and were seen as gan obstructive forceh against Koizumi.In fact, in terms of adopting a stance of trade protectionism, the SDP and JCP hold exactly the same position as the LDP elements associated with the Agricultural Ministry and Agricultural Cooperative Union, and they shouted against gstructural reform.h
On this point the JCP was particularly gzealous,h but the SDP also defended the same position as the conservatives in the name of gcitizen movementsh for the environment and health care. In reality, there was little difference between this party and the gconservative wingh of the LDP.
The SDP and JCP were seen as more in support of the status quo than the greformists,h and this is natural.
For instance, the JCP argued that the greformh of eliminating bad debt should not be done, since this would lead to the collapse of small and medium size businesses. However, the bad credit of the banks is mainly directed towards general contractors, so to oppose the reorganization of bad debt amounts to a struggle for their interests--by saying that saving the contractors will save small and medium size businesses. This comes down to the idea that the interests of large companies is also the interests of smaller businesses, and that these are somehow in agreement.
In words only they speak of small and medium sized businesses, but objectively the JCP is opposing reforms for the sake of general contractors, and in this way reveal their own reactionary essence as gconservativesh who opposes all greform.h
This recent election also clarified the definitive collapse of the JCPfs tactic of supporting candidates not affiliated to any political party. These non-party candidates who the JCP had counted on, in fact overwhelmingly sided with the LDP, and this exposed the impotence and sterility of the JCP strategy.
The fact that voter turnout did not rise, shows that there are many people not affiliated to any party who donft support the LDP, but at the same time see no point in participating in the election. They are intuitively suspicious of Koizumifs LDP, but still have no faith in the counterfeit goppositionh JCP and others. The low voter level shows that the SDP and JCP are incapable of rallying a wide stratum of workers to oppose Koizumi.
True gReformh Can Only Be Accomplished by the Working ClassLeading up to the LDPfs big victory, bourgeois politicians (including the Democratic Party) were petrified in fear. Even in the wake of the victory, they have more cause to tremble in fear than rejoice in the LDP victory.
They tremble because they worry that Koizumi will not be able to carry out his promised greforms,h and fear the consequences. Everyone knows that it is easy to speak of greforms,h but difficult to actually carry them out. Koizumi dared to openly and clearly raise this as a gnational task.h As a result, no political party will now be able to easily shirk this responsibility.
Koizumifs LDP firmly promised gstructural reform,h and on the basis of this promise they were able to scrape together support from the people. But Koizumi does not have the true desire, outlook, or means to achieve this. The promise for gstructural reformh has been made, but now the LDP is filled with dread at the prospect that the emptiness of this promise will be plainly revealed.
Even if the LDP were to firmly push through gstructural reformh this would only result in their own dissolution since such reforms would remove the very basis of the party by unearthing the privileges and rights that only exist on the basis of the huge infusion of state money.
On the other hand, if these reforms are sabotaged and cannot be implemented, and the old system that is dissolving staggers on, Koizumi will have broken his promise, and may be quickly voted out of office.
There is little hope for Koizumi no matter which path he takes. The slogan of greformh has been raised, but ultimately this remains an empty phrase. If there is any significance to Koizumifs government, it is merely that the government has loudly presented this slogan of greform.h In the sense of merely raising a slogan, Koizumi is nothing more than a quixotic figure.
If the collapse of companies continues, the number of unemployed increases by thousands, and the gpainh Koizumi speaks of deepens, it will probably become impossible to continue the line of gstructural reform.h Koizumi talks about genduring pain,h but if this pain continues for two or three years (and Koizumi has nonchalantly told people gto be patient for two or three yearsh), it becomes totally different story.
Of course, the working class firmly supports gstructural reformh--indeed in its most thorough form. But this refers to the fundamental gstructural reformh in which the rule of capital is swept away, and the liberation of the workers is achieved.
There is no way for such profound reform to be carried out under the LDP, or under the rule of capital in general. Koizumifs gstructural reformh will ultimately face this dilemma. Through Koizumifs victory, the time has arrived when this truth will become clear.
The thorough greformh of the capitalist system is only possible and realistic in the form of a revolution to sweep away the rule of capital by the workers who are presently exploited by monopoly capital. Koizumifs brand of reform, by contrast, is nothing but a castle built in the air.
(Translated by Roy)