Marxfs Theory of Ground-Rent

(From 'For Advocating "The Labor Value Theory"' 1999)

Written by Hiroyoshi Hayashi
Translated by Roy West


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CONTENTS (Sorry, Those Except I Are Getting Ready.)

1. Introduction:  The gPremiseh of Marxfs Theory of Ground-Rent
2. On Differential Rent
3. Absolute Rent and gGenuine Monopoly Priceh
4. An Overview: On the Distinction Between the Different Forms of Rent
5. The Extinction of Rent and Socialism


1 Introduction:

The gPremiseh of Marxfs Theory of Ground-Rent

In chapter forty-seven of the third volume of Capital, Marx frames the question: gIt is necessary to clarify the exact nature of the difficulty faced by modern economics, as the theoretical expression of the capitalist mode of production, in its treatment of ground rent.h?He then responds to this question:@

The difficulty consists rather in showing how, after the equalization of surplus-value between the various capitals to give the average profit, whereby they receive a share in the total surplus-value produced by the social capital in all spheres of production together that is corresponding and proportionate to their relative sizes?in showing how, after this equalization, after the distribution of all the surplus-value that there is to distribute has apparently already taken place, there is still an excess part of this surplus-value left over, a part which capital invested on the land pays to the landowner in the form of ground-rent. cThe whole difficulty in analyzing rent thus consisted in explaining the excess of agricultural profit over @average-profit; not surplus-value as such, but rather the extra surplus-value specific to this sphere of production; i.e. not even the gnet product,h but rather the extra net product over and above the net product of other branches of industry. (Capital Vol 3, Penguin Classics, pp. 917-8)

The meaning of this passage is the following: The surplus-value that is created through capitalist production should be equalized into gaverage profith by means of competition between different capitals, but nevertheless landed property, based on its titular right, is able to receive rent, that is a clear surplus-value without compensation. The question is why, exactly, this occurs, and where this surplus-value comes from. After surplus-value has been distributed as average profit, how can we account for this special surplus-value? Is this in fact something purely arbitrary and disconnected from theory, which contradicts the principles of value and capital?that is, is it simply an excess profit arising from a simple or ggenuineh monopoly price? This is the manner in which Marx approached the question of ground-rent, setting himself the theoretical task of answering these questions.

If ground-rent comes from ggenuine monopoly priceh then there would be no theoretical difficulty. If this were the case, it would be sufficient to pose the problem of ground-rent in terms of being a deposit paid from the special profit determined according to the needs of consumers and their ability to pay. In fact, however, ground-rent is not determined by ggenuine monopoly price.h@

In a sense, of course, all rent is a special profit that comes from a monopoly price?this is it is one part of surplus-value that landed property receives on the basis of ownership rights. Marx, however, explains the gnormalh forms of rent (differential and absolute rent) in distinction from what he refers to as ggenuine monopoly price.h He makes such a distinction because the commodity price resulting in rent is certainly not simply a price (land price) determined by supply and demand. Rather, Marx explains this price through a particular application of the theory of value and production price (the transformed form of value). This relation is clear in the case of differential rent, but absolute rent must also be posited within the determinations of the law of value.

Marxfs theory of rent was consciously developed as a theory of capitalistic rent, and therefore it presupposes an understanding of value, surplus-value, and the transformation of surplus value into profit. In other words, it is necessary to understand the formation of the average rate of profit and the transformation of profit into production price (see the sixth section of third volume of Capital). Therefore, a correct understanding of Marxfs theory of rent must be based on an overall understanding of the theory of value and surplus-value. Here, however, we cannot possibly provide a comprehensive explanation of these points, and will thus refer to these premises only when the necessity arises.

Marx poses the question of capitalistic ground-rent (its two normal forms: differential and absolute rent), but at the same time he does not completely neglect the question of ground-rent in general or the various historical forms that it has taken. Marx at the same time elucidates and scientifically defines rent in general and the many historical forms it has taken, while discussing the relation of this to capitalistic rent,

Since Marx fundamentally deals with the problem of capitalistic ground-rent, or ground-rent in agricultural production (grain production), this seems to be a purely abstract theory that has no direct relationship to the problem of rent in contemporary Japan. In a sense this is the case, since today in Japan capitalistic agriculture has not been established and small-scale production is still predominant. In the form of gcontractual cultivation,h the relations of ground-rent have developed in agriculture to some extent, but this cannot be called the dominant relation within agriculture. Moreover, this relation has been regulated by means of the power of the state. Every day, in every aspect of the production of capital and the life of working people, we are reminded that the question of rent?either in its independent, pure form, or in connection to various forms of profit and interest?is not an inconsequential thing. Most workers, for example, are obliged to pay a huge sum of roughly one-third of their income for ghousing rent.h It is clear that this sum includes a gtribute,h either in rent or interest on gcapital,h made to an unproductive class (owners of land and residential buildings) that has a parasitical relation towards the working class. Furthermore, gland priceh is also determined by rent, since the gpriceh of land is essentially rent reduced to capital through interest rates. However, here we will limit ourselves to the theory of ground-rent developed by Marx, and leave to another time the discussion of the application of this theory to present-day reality in Japan. There is no question, however, that Marxfs theory of ground-rent has great practical significance, and this point will be made clear in the final section of this paper when we look at the conditions necessary for the elimination of ground-rent.

To begin with, I would like to say a word about Marxfs method or manner of developing his theory of rent. After clarifying the premise of the theory of ground-rent?the idea that capitalistic production adapts and subordinates landed property to its own purposes?Marx begins by analyzing how one sector of industrial capital can make use of the forces of nature in a gwaterfallh to generate excess profits, thereby generating differential rent. This overview of differential rent is followed by a concrete and comprehensive explanation of differential rent within agriculture; and then a definition of absolute rent. (These chapters are then followed by a discussion of the rent of buildings and mines, the price of land, as well as a historical overview of rent. In Theories of Surplus Value, Marx described the significance of this gmethodh in the following way: @

The element in which the capital employed in agriculture is invested, is the soil (nature), etc. Hence rent is here equal to the excess of the value of the product of labor created in this element, over its average price. If, on the other hand, an element of nature (or material) which is privately owned by an individual, is employed in another sphere of production whose (physical) basis it does not form, then the rent, if it only comes into being through the employment of this element, cannot consist in the excess of the value of this product over the average price, but only in the excess of the general average price of this product over its own average price. For instance, a waterfall may replace the steam-engine for a manufacturer and save him consumption of coal. While in possession of this waterfall, he would, for instance, constantly be selling yarn above its average price and making an excess profit. If the waterfall belongs to a landowner, this excess profit accrues to him as rent. In his book on rent, Mr. Hopkins observes that in Lancashire the waterfalls not only yield rent but, according to the degree of natural motive power, they yield differential rent. Here rent is purely the excess of the average market price of the product over its individual average price. (MECW vol. 31, pp. 355-56) gA stream, favorably situated, furnishes an instance of rent being paid for an appropriated gift of nature, of as exclusive a kind as any that can be named.h (Ibid. p. 368)

From this passage we can see why Marx starts with differential rent, and the form of differential rent in industrial capital, rather than directly in agriculture. Differential rent can be formed in any of the sectors where capital is invested; on the other hand absolute rent only characteristically appears in agriculture?and is not general in the case of capital. To the extent that differential rent is penetrated by the laws of capitalism, it can arise anywhere (provided conditions exist), while absolute rent only exists in conditions where agriculture is generally lagging behind industry and the price of its products is higher than the production price (consumption price plus average profit). Differential rent is the outcome of the penetration of the capitalistic economic system, while absolute ground-rent can only be realized by preventing the penetration of such laws. Here one essential distinction is present. The formation of special profit from differential rent can be explained by the laws of capital, but in the case of absolute ground-rent the explanation must be mediated by landed property, and to this extent is more particular. Thus, we must also start with differential rent according to Marx.@

2 On Differential Rent

Prior to Marx, Ricardo had already developed a theory of differential rent and his understanding was comparatively good (although his theory had many defects and mistakes?such as combining it with the glaw diminishing returnsh). Still, to understand this kind of rent it is important to have a scientific conception of capital, not to mention value. Marx says the following about Ricardofs theory of rent:@

Value is labor. So surplus-value cannot be earth. The landfs absolute fertility does nothing but let a certain quantum of labor give a certain product, conditioned by the natural fertility of the land. The differences in the landfs fertility have the effect that the same amounts of labor and capital, i.e. the same value, are expressed in different quantities of agricultural products; so that these products have different individual values. The equalization of these individual values to give market values means that gthe advantages of fertile over inferior lands arectransferred from the cultivator, or consumer, to the landlord.h (Ricardo, Principles) (vol. 3 p. 954)@

Here Ricardo is not very precise, but he has clearly defined the essence of differential rent.

In explaining differential rent in general, Marx draws examples not from agriculture, but from the guse of waterfalls.h He does this because differential rent can arise from a natural force that raises production and is quantitatively limited so that the gnatural force can be monopolizedh (see Marxfs explanation in the quote in the first section).

After gestablishing the general concept of differential rent,h Marx then moves on to the gconsideration of differential rent within agriculture.h However, Marx says that we should consider the significance of the concept of differential rent not only in agriculture, but in capitalistic production in general. He teaches us that the form of excess profit turned into differential rent is merely the outcome of capitalistic production; that is, the fruit of capitalistic conditions?the free competition of capital, the transferability of capital from one sphere of production to another, the formation of average profit, and therefore the transformation of value into production price, etc. For these reasons, for a theory of rent, the theory of value and its transformation into production price must first be established. Without the correct theory of value and capital, a correct theory of rent is impossible.

As is well known, Marx demonstrated that with the establishment of capitalistic production, the commodity is exchanged not on the basis of gvalueh (a socially determined quantity of labor, or a certain amount of objectified social labor), but rather on the basis of gproduction price.h This is the same thing as what Smith called the gnatural price,h that is, the gcosth necessary for the production of the commodity plus the gaverage profit.h Here the concept of average profit must be understood. Commodity production does not stop with simple commodity production, but when it turns into capitalistic commodity production, each capital seeks profit in proportion to its own size (this is enforced through competition).

However, the organic composition of capital in each sector of production (i.e. the ratio of constant to variable capital) differs greatly, and therefore if the ratio of surplus-value (ratio of exploitation) is fixed (remains the same, constant?), the profit ratio will certainly not be in proportion to the size of capital. This is a self-contradiction for capital as value, and capital as aggregate capital redistributes the overall surplus-value in accordance to the size of each separate capital. Even if the aggregate capital is 500 and the aggregate surplus-value is 110, the profit will all be at the level of 23 percent regardless of the organic composition of each capital. In short, the general (average) profit ratio formation, is not by the gvalueh of the commodity of each capital, but is sold according to the gproduction price.h In this case, of course, between the value of each commodity and production price, a certain distance arises. However, seen overall, value and production price are in agreement, and the aggregate of surplus-value and profit are in agreement.

However, for the purpose of this article we need not go further in the explanation of profit ratio and production price. I will leave a more detailed study of the matter to the readers themselves and proceed with the topic at hand.

At any rate, when the commodity as the product of capital is sold, not as gvalue,h but as gproduction price,h it is sold as the product of land and production price. That is according to the presupposition, agriculture is also managed by the capitalist farmer. The question is: what sort of the production price is the production price in agriculture? That is, the products of the land, depending on the natural productivity of the land, each yield different production prices. Moreover, unlike industry, the differences in productivity do not exist as temporary, constantly dissolving differences. Under such conditions, the prices of products of the land are determined by the sales price of the products of the worst land, and therefore its individual production price becomes the market-adjusted production price.

Differential rent is a special profit appropriated by landed property as rent which is formed from the fact that products of the land are produced on land that have different rates of fertility. Simply put it is the following?A and B are two types of land, A is more inferior land and B has a higher rate of productivity (natural fertility). What determines the market price of the product of the land (for instance wheat) is Afs wheat, not Bfs. This is because wheat is wheat and there is no essential difference between the land A and B, they are the same commodity which is sold at the same price. If the demand for wheat would not be met by the production of B alone, and it were necessary to also produce on land A, wheat would have to be sold at a high enough level to ensure the average profit for the capitalist who manages land A.

If it cannot be sold at this price, then capital would stop the production of wheat and move to another sector. Conversely, if the average rate of profit can be obtained, capital would produce on land A, and in this way the market sales price, i.e. production price, of A would determine the price of wheat. In this case, it is not a question of whether A or B will produce a greater quantity. Even if A were to produce 10 percent and B 90 percent, the production cost determining the market price of wheat would be the production price of A, not B. Here we are not dealing with the principles of the gmarket priceh wherein the commodity of average conditions, or the product that can be produced in the greatest quantity, plays the determining role.

This can be expressed numerically in the following way: The production cost of wheat (market-adjusted production cost) is determined by the production price of Afs wheat, for instance: 100Kp + 15P = 115 (Kp = cost price, P = average profit). On the other hand, B has higher productivity, and its cost price would be 90 rather than 100. Therefore, if this were sold at a market adjusted production price of 115, profit would be 25, rather than 15. This would mean a excess profit of 10. This excess profit would pass not to the hands of the capitalist farmer, but rather to the landowner, since the higher productive power creating this surplus profit stems from the landed property, rather than capital. In short, this difference of 10 (between individual profit and average profit) is differential rent.@

The surplus profit that arises from this use of the waterfall thus arises not from the capital but rather from the use by capital of a monopolizable and monopolized natural force. (p. 785)@

Concerning differential rent, Marx says that, git does not contribute to determining the general production price of the commodity, but takes this as given.h (p. 785) This differential rent arises from differences in the productiveness of the monopolizable natural force, but he emphasizes that this natural force gis not the source of the surplus profit, but simply a natural basis for it,h (p. 786) Marx then explains the relationship between differential rent and landed property in the following way:@

Landed property does not create the portion of value that is transformed into surplus profit; rather it simply enables the landowner, the proprietor of the waterfall, to entice this surplus profit out of the manufacturerfs pocket and into his own. It is not the cause of this surplus profitfs creation, but simply its transformation into the form of ground-rent, hence of the appropriation of this portion of profit or commodity price by the landowner or waterfall-owner. (p. 786)@

This is very important concerning the distinction with absolute rent.

Here we will not go into detail concerning the I and II forms of differential rent and the Ricardofs theory regarding this (principles of crop depletion, etc.), or the fundamental criticism of this. The I form of differential rent is, theoretically, the rent from a situation in which the same amount of capital is invested in the same quantity of land, but yields different crops, and the II form is rent that arises when capital is invested continuously, intensively, and with different productivity, on the same land. In considering these cases in detail, Marx draws many conclusions, but we wonft deal with this here.@

3 Absolute Rent and gGenuine Monopoly Priceh@

Absolute rent, as the name implies, is rent that is gabsoluteh?that is rent in general that can arise even on the poorest land. This is gabsoluteh to the extent that glanded property operates as an absolute barrier.h

As we can understand well from our own experience, even inferior land is not given by the landowner to the capitalist free for him to manage it to make a profit. Here the capitalist meets an galien power and restriction.h @

Here landed property is the barrier that does not permit any new capital investment on formerly uncultivated or unleased land without levying a toll, i.e. demanding a rent, even if the land newly brought under cultivation is of a kind that does not yield any differential rent, and which save for landed property could have been cultivated already with a smaller rise in the market price, so that the governing market price would have paid the tiller of this worst land only his price of production. But as a result of the barrier that landed property sets up, the market price must rise to a point at which the land can pay a surplus over the price of the production, i.e. a rent. (p. 896)@

In other words, absolute rent is a rent that is obtained by actively raising the price of the product over the price of production, and in this case git is not the rise in the productfs price that is the cause of the rent but rather the rent that is the cause of the rise in price.h (p. 897) The excess value of a product over its production price,h i.e. absolute rent, makes up one determining moment of the general market price. Here landed property raises the price of agricultural products to produce rent, and this is the fundamental difference from differential rent.@

Landed property, whenever production needs land, whether for agriculture or for the extraction of raw materials, blocks this equalization for the capitals invested on the land and captures a portion of surplus-value which would otherwise go into the equalization process, giving the general rate of profit. Rent then forms a part of the value of commodities, in particular of their surplus-value, which simply accrues to the landowners who extract it from the capitalists, instead of to the capitalist class who have extracted it from the workers. It is assumed in this connection that agricultural capital sets more labor in motion than an equally large portion of non-agricultural capital. The extent of this gap, or its existence at all, depends on the relative development of agriculture vis-a-vis industry. By the nature of the case, this difference must decline with the progress of agriculture, unless the ratio in which the variable part of the capital declines vis-a-vis the constant part is still greater in industrial capital than in agricultural. (p. 906)@

The above explanation of the concept of absolute rent should be basically clear, but the difficult question of where this rent and the ggenuine monopoly priceh come from still remains. This is because it is not easy to theoretically explain this as a ggenuine monopoly price.h

Absolute rent is defined as a rent of the monopoly of landed@property which places a barrier before capital. If this is the case, this means that it is ga rent based on the genuine monopoly price.h Why then is it not called a rent of genuine monopoly price?

Here a number of distinctions arise. First of all, the price part of this rent is not merely nominal, but one part of the value of agricultural products. Put in general terms, the agricultural sector lags behind the industrial sector, and has a lower organic composition of capital. Therefore, when average profit rates are formed, and turned into production price, the production price of agricultural products is fixed at a level lower below its value (this is because of the lower organic composition, meaning fixed capital is higher proportionally, and thus there is a greater proportion of directly exploited workers, and this has more surplus-value than other sectors. In forming the average rates of profit, the agricultural sector distributes one part of its surplus value to other commercial capital.) Absolute rent is nothing but the gexcess value over the production priceh of agricultural profits, not the excess price that exceeds the value of the product (this is instead the fundamental characteristic of the ggenuine monopoly priceh).

In Capital, there is a passage where Marx compares the gnormalh forms of rent (differential and absolute) with rent based on the ggenuine monopoly price.h@

Even though landed property can drive the price of agricultural products above their price of production, it does not depend on this, but rather on the general state of the market, how far the market price rises above the price of production and towards the value, and to what extent, therefore, the surplus-value produced over and above the given average profit in agriculture is either transformed into rent or goes into the general equalization of surplus-value that settles the average profit. In any case, this absolute rent, arising from the excess value over and above the price of production, is simply part of the agricultural surplus-value, the transformation of this surplus-value into rent, its seizure by landed property, at the general governing price of production. These two forms of rent are the only normal ones. Apart from this, rent can derive only from a genuine monopoly price, which is determined neither by the price of production of the commodities nor by the value, but rather by the demand of the purchasers and their ability to pay, consideration of which belongs to the theory of competition, where the actual movement of market prices is investigated. (p. 898)@

Here the distinction between absolute rent, differential rent, and ggenuine monopoly priceh is defined. That is, unlike differential rent determined by the production price, and ggenuine monopoly priceh determined by gthe demand of the purchasers and their ability to pay,h absolute rent is determined by value. It is clearly said that this is gthe excess value over and above the price of productionh and the transformation of gsurplus-value produced in agricultureh into rent. And as the portion of value transformed into rent grows larger, the price of agricultural products rises, making the participation of the equalization of the average profit of the surplus-value produced in agriculture that much smaller.

Therefore, absolute rent as a category of grent based on genuine monopoly price,h becomes less important as the organic composition of agricultural capital grows larger and becomes gsocially average capital.h This is because what produces absolute rent is the low organic composition of agricultural sector, and capital is mainly or almost exclusively expended in variable capital, i.e. labor, and therefore has more surplus-value when compared to other capital of equal size, but this situation would disappear.

Secondly, absolute ground-rent is not simply monopoly price (not a purely a monopoly-added price) because landed property itself does not put to an end the free competition among capital. That is, if the demand for crops expands and the market price rises, capital will seek production in newly cultivated land, and competition between the capital of various land?whether this is more capital investment in already existing cultivated land or in newly cultivated land?will intensify. As a result of this, the production of agricultural products will expand and price will depend on the standard of the new landed property?i.e. the inferior land. It is clear that this is not the ggenuine monopoly price.h gGenuine monopoly priceh is not the intensification of competition, but rather its absence, for the concept to have suitable content. Marxfs absolute ground-rent is not a gcompetition theory that researches the movement of the reality of market prices,h but rather is determined within the scope of the concept of value and its transformation into production price.

In the eighth chapter of Theories of Surplus Value, Marx critically examines the ideas of Rodbertus and Ricardo, and has much to say. He recognizes that in a sense ground-rent is a monopoly price?in the sense that just as the gmonopolizationh of the means of production provides the right to exploit labor and extract a surplus, so does the gmonopolizationh of the land provide the right to obtain ground rent? but he was opposed to defining this (absolute ground-rent) as ggenuine monopoly priceh: @

For it is precisely the competition of capitals amongst themselves which enables the landlord to demand from the individual capitalist that he should be satisfied with gan average profith and pay over to him the overplus of the value over the price affording this profit.

But, it may be asked: If landed property gives the power to sell the product above its cost price [in Capital Marx calls this gproduction priceh?Hayashi], at its value [in Capital this is not necessarily gat its valueh but the excess value over the production price, i.e. the difference between the value and production price], why does it not equally give the power to sell the product above its value, at an arbitrary monopoly price. On a small island, where there is no foreign trade in corn, the corn, food, like every other product, could unquestionably be sold at a monopoly price, that is, at a price only limited by the state of demand, i.e., of demand backed by the ability to payc

Leaving out of account exceptions of this kind?which cannot occur in European countries; even in England a large part of the fertile land is artificially withdrawn from agriculture and from the market in general in order to raise the value of the other part?landed property can only affect and paralyse the action of capitals, their competition, in so far as the competition of capitals modifies the determination of the values of the commodities. The conversion of values into cost prices (production prices) is only the consequence and result of the development of capitalist production. Originally commodities are (on the average) sold at their values. Deviation from this is in agriculture prevented by landed property. (vol. 31 pp. 542-3)@@

In other words, landed property creates absolute rent, but while being subordinate to the action of capital (competition), not the goriginal monopoly price,h it takes the form of a barrier to the transformation of value into production price. The competition between capitals is premised, and therefore absolute rent cannot be explained by the goriginal monopoly priceh which presupposes its suspension. For this reason, Marx says the following:@

The view that rent arises from the monopoly price of agricultural products, the monopoly price being due to the landowners possessing the monopoly of the land. According to this concept, the price of the agricultural product is constantly above its value. There is a surcharge of price and the law of value of commodities is breached by the monopoly of landed property.

Rent arises out of the monopoly price of agricultural products, because supply is constantly above the level of supply. But why does supply not rise to the level of demand? Why does not an additional supply equalize this relationship and thus, according to this theory, abolish all rent? (ibid. pp. 387-8)@

He also criticizes Rodbertus in the following way:@

It is wrong to say, as Rodbertus does: If?according to the general law?the agricultural product is sold on an average at its value then it must yield an excess profit, alias rent; as though this selling of the commodity at its value, above its average price, were the general law of capitalist production. On the contrary, it must be shown why in primary production?by way of exception and in contrast to the class of industrial products whose value similarly stands above their average price?the values are not reduced to the average prices and therefore yield an excess profit, alias rent. This is to be explained simply by property in land. The equalization takes place only between capitals, because only the action of capitals on one another has the force to assert the inherent laws of capital. In this respect, those who derive rent from monopoly are right. Just as it is the monopoly of capital alone that enables the capitalist to squeeze surplus labor out of the worker, so the monopoly of landownership enables the landed proprietor to squeeze that part of surplus labor from the capitalist which would form a constant excess profit. But those who derive rent from monopoly are mistaken when they imagine that monopoly enables the landed proprietor to force the price of the commodity above its value. On the contrary, it makes it possible to maintain the value of the commodity above its average price; to sell the commodity not above but at its value.

Modified in this way, the proposition is correct. It explains the existence of rent, whereas Ricardo only explains the existence of different rents and actually does not credit the ownership of land with any economic effect. (MECW, vol. 31. pp. 326-27)@

From the quote above it is clear that the price caused by absolute rent, is not simply a monopoly price determined solely by demand. If it were simply a monopoly price it could exceed the value of the commodity and appreciate a great deal, but landed property does not have this ability since by placing an obstacle to the reciprocal competition between capital?not allowing the use of land without the payment of compensation?this does not in itself eliminate competition or even fundamentally limit it. If capital is able to obtain an average profit after paying rent, then there will be gfreeh investment in the agricultural sector, and the landowners do not have the power to gprohibith this. To this extent, the competition of capital also penetrates agriculture. And it can in fact be said that rent is one outcome of such penetration.@

4 An Overview:

On the Distinction Between the Different Forms of Rent@

We can deepen our understanding of differential ground-rent and absolute ground-rent?gthe two normal forms of ground-renth?by explaining each one and then comparing the two forms. This comparison was made in the passage above, and in the following passage of Marx:@

Differential rent has the peculiarity that here landed property seizes only the surplus profit that the farmer himself would otherwise pocket, and under certain circumstances does pocket for the duration of his tenancy. Here landed property simply causes the transfer of a portion of the commodity price that arises without any effort on its part (rather as a result of the determination by competition on the production price governing the market), a portion reducible to surplus profit, from one person to the other, from the capitalist to the landowner. Landed property is not in this case a cause that creates this component of price or the rise in price that it presupposes. But (in the case of absolute rent?Hayashi) if the worst type-A land cannot be cultivated?even though its cultivation would yield the price of production?until it yields a surplus over and above this production price, a rent, then landed property is the creative basis of this rise in price. Landed property has produced this rent itself. (vol 3 p. 889)

Absolute rent is the excess of value over the average price of raw produce. Differential rent is the excess of the market price of the produce grown on favored soils over the value of their own produce. (vol. 31 p. 370)@

Of course, the terminology used here by Marx was not strictly followed in Capital. gAverage priceh more exactly is gproduction price.h Moreover, the definition of differential rent is the difference between the market adjusted production price and the individual production price. However, if one is aware that production price itself is the transformed form of value, Marxfs manner of expression here does not impede the understanding of differential rent at all. That is, the value of the crops on superior land, is naturally lower than the market price of the crops. Therefore, by selling it at the market price a special profit clearly emerges, and when the landowner takes this profit, on the basis of the authority of ownership, this is differential rent.

To further deepen the understanding of differential and absolute ground-rent, letfs look at the distinction between the two in a number of provisions.

First of all, the price part (excess profit) that accrues to ground-rent is fundamentally different from the relationship of landed property. In the case of differential rent, its price is not actively formed by landed property. Rather, this presupposes the transformation of profit into average profit and value into production price, i.e. the transformation of gmarket price into adjusted average.h Various levels of land fertility will yield products that are sold at different values (market adjusted production price) and to this extent landed property does not play an active role in the price formation. This is not the forced principle of landed property, but the principle of capital wherein all of the identical commodities gain an average profit, and must be sold at the same cost (i.e. gthe determination of market price adjusted production price through competition). A more favorable landfs products will receive a special profit and this is the outcome of this law and the outcome of this price, but this does not mean that the landed property creates the price itself. Based on the right of private ownership, landed property turns the special profit into differential rent and puts this into his own pocket.

On the other hand, in the case of absolute rent, landed property actively creates the price of the agricultural product. That is, rent alone pushes the price above the production price. By not allowing cultivation until rent is produced, landed property forces this rent on capital. Here, more than in differential rent, landed property insists on its own rights.

Therefore, the following distinction naturally emerges between these two kinds of rent. In the price of agricultural products resulting from differential rent, the production price alone is the issue?that is, the difference between the gmarket priceh and gindividual priceh of agricultural products; whereas in the price of absolute rent this is a question of gan excess part of valueh above the production price. This gexcess part of valueh does not exceed the value of the agricultural product, and is an gexcess part of valueh determined within the bounds of the difference between the size of the production price and that of value (see the figure above).Therefore, this is not determined by the production price, but rather the value, since this is gexcess part of valueh that exceeds the production price but does not exceed the value of the agricultural product.

Furthermore, a difference arises from the source of this special profit (rent). Marx wrote a famous passage describing differential rent as a gfalse social value,h and there was a big debate in Japan over this (although most of this is pedantic blather, particularly that of Uno Kozo and Ouchi). Marx, using a chart, illustrated that 10 quarters of wheat with a value of 240 shillings, sold for 600 shillings would yield a differential rent of 360 shillings, and then said the following:@

This is determination by a market value brought about by competition on the basis of the capitalist mode of production; it is competition that produces a false social value. This results from the law of market value to which agricultural products are subjected. The determination of the market value of products, i.e. also of products of the soil, is a social act, even if performed by society unconsciously and unintentionally, and it is based necessarily on the exchange-value of the product and not on the soil and the differences in its fertility. If we imagine that the capitalist form of society has been abolished and that society has been organized as a conscious association working according to a plan, the 10 qrs represent a quantity of autonomous labor-time equal to that contained in 240s. Society would therefore not purchase this product at 2.5 times the actual labor time contained it; the basis for a class of landowners would thereby disappear. (vol. 3 p. 799) @

Differential rent is not surplus-value formed in the agricultural sector, a social surplus-value paid to landowners by society. This is gfalseh because even though it is expressed as gmarket valueh it is lacking in substance. What seems to have a value of 600 shillings is in fact a value of 240 shillings. The difference of 360 shillings in value is a sum paid by society to the simply parasitical class of landowners.

It is clear that this gfalse social valueh is not always one part of the surplus-value produced in the agricultural sector. The fact that the total production price of 240 shillings is in fact turned into 600 shillings is that society, gseen as a consumer,h paid this amount, and in this case the part of the surplus-value produced by agriculture has no direct relation to this.

On the other hand, in the case of absolute rent the surplus-value that is produced in agriculture is turned into rent through the power of the landowner. That is, this comes from the excess part of value that exceeds the production price of the agricultural product. Theoretically, this is nothing but the transformation of the surplus-value formed in agriculture into rent. Unlike differential rent, this is a part of surplus-value that exceeds the production price of the commodity itself.

The distinction between differential and absolute ground-rent is the one above, but we need to summarize the difference between these two forms and ggenuine monopoly price.h In particular, there is a certain difficulty in understanding the difference between absolute rent and rent based upon monopoly price. This is because, in a sense, rent presupposes the restricted nature of the monopoly on land (private ownership).

What can be said first of all is that genuine monopoly price can be formed in any landed property. For example, extremely special wine that can only be produced in certain limited regions, will likely have a great monopoly price on the market. That is, as Marx says, a price gdetermined neither by the price of production of the commodities nor by their value, but rather by the demand of the purchasers and their ability to pay, consideration of which therefore belongs to the theory of competition, where the actual movement of market prices is investigated.h (vol. 3 p. 898) This monopoly price can create another kind of rent. However, this is fundamentally different from differential and absolute ground-rent which can be explained theoretically according to the determination by value or the price of production?its size, limitations and essence.

This ggenuine monopoly priceh can not only be removed from the price of production, but can also exceed the limitations of value?has no limits?and in this sense the difference between the two kinds of rent is clear. Marx defined absolute rent as a rent ultimately coming not from monopoly price, but rather from the regulation of landed property, and this point holds great significance. In terms of creating a special profit that boosts up the price, ggenuine monopoly priceh is identical to absolute ground-rent. On the other hand, however, in the sense that price is presupposed and landed property merely takes in the excess profit that is created?paid for by the gsociety as consumerh?this can also be said to also share an identical aspect with differential ground-rent. Still, the price that makes both monopoly price and differential ground-rent possible is a price of an essentially different dimension.

We must recognize that ground-rent?even as monopoly price? does not discard the law of value. All forms of rent are a kind of surplus-value of society, that is, it is profit, interest, ground-rent, and other unearned income. This is the sum of surplus-labor and nothing else.

Moreover, the difference between absolute ground-rent and differential ground-rent becomes apparent in its gelimination.h That is, absolute ground-rent can be geliminatedh on the foundation of capitalistic production?although whether this is possible and does in fact occur is a separate problem?whereas differential ground-rent will not disappear as long as capitalism continues. However, this already brings us to our next topic.@

5 The Extinction of Rent and Socialism

Rent is essentially one historical social relation, one relation of human beings in a society based on private property in which gthe monopoly of a piece of the earth enables the so-called landowner to exact a tribute, to put a price on it.h (p. 762)

Therefore, it is perfectly clear that this will disappear along with the elimination of private property. However, on the other hand, for capital, landed property is also something extra, a relation that is not always necessary for its development. Of course, it is clear that land is essential for the movement of capital as one of the objective conditions of production. However, for capital this does not represent an essential moment. The essential thing for capital is the relationship between capital and wage labor?i.e. the social relationship between the labor=production means accumulated in the past and living labor. Land as a simply natural thing, although important, lies outside of this relationship.

Thus, as long as capitalism continues, differential rent will not disappear, but absolute rent can disappear upon the basis of capitalist production (here we can see an important distinction between these two kinds of rent). This elimination of absolute rent is possible under two different scenarios.

First of all, through the abolishment of the private ownership of land and its nationalization. Here, land only, as one of the means of production, is nationalized, but capitalist production continues as before. Under this condition, absolute rent is ended because there is no private ownership of the land. By removing the resistance of land to the movement of capital, capitalist development can advance further.

As we have already seen in the discussion of absolute ground-rent, unlike differential ground-rent, absolute ground-rent directly influences the price of agricultural products. That is, it raises their price and in this way drags down the general rate of profit. This means that the interests of the landowning class come at the expense of the bourgeois class. For capital, the nationalization of the land would mean getting rid of this unnecessary element, and thus the gradical bourgeoisieh have raised the slogan of gnationalizing the land.h@

The difference between the productive power of steam and that of the soil is thus only that one yields unpaid labor to the capitalist and the other to the landowner, who does not take it away from the worker, but from the capitalist. The capitalist is therefore so enthusiastic about this element gbelonging to no one.h

Only this much is correct:

Assuming the capitalist mode of production, the capitalist is not only a necessary functionary, but the dominating functionary in production. The landowner, on the other hand, is quite superfluous in this mode of production. Its only requirement is that land should not be common property, that it should confront the working class as a condition of production, not belonging to it, and the purpose is completely fulfilled if it becomes State property, i.e., if the State draws the rent. The landowner, such an important functionary in production in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages, is a useless superfetation in the industrial world. The radical bourgeois (with an eye besides to the suppression of all other taxes) therefore goes forward theoretically to a refutation of the private ownership of the land, which, in the form of State property, he would like to turn into the common property of the bourgeois class, of capital. But in practice he lacks the courage, since an attack on one form of property?a form of the private ownership of a condition of labor?might cast considerable doubts on the other form. Besides, the bourgeois has himself become an owner of the land. (vol 31 p. 278)

There is another case in which absolute ground-rent could be eliminated on the basis of capitalism. Absolute ground-rent necessitates agriculture to lag behind industry relatively, so that the value of its products are comparatively high. If agriculture develops more rapidly than industry and this comparative lag were to be overcome, theoretically at least, absolute ground-rent would not be able to exist.@

Due to landed property, the graw producth is distinguished by the privilege that its value is not reduced to the average price. If, indeed its value did decrease, which would be possible despite your gvalue of the material,h to the level of the average price of commodities, then rent would disappear. (vol. 31 p. 381)

The absolute rent may rise because the general rate of profit falls, owing to new advances in industryc.

The absolute rent can fall, because the value of agricultural produce falls and the general rate of profit rises. It can fall, because the value of the agricultural produce falls as a result of a fundamental change in the organic composition of capital, without the rate of profit rising. It can disappear completely, as soon as the value of the agricultural produce becomes = the cost price [production price?H], in other words when the agricultural capital has the same composition as the non-agricultural capital.

Ricardofs proposition would only be correct if expressed like this: When the value of agricultural produce = its cost price, then there is no absolute rent. But he is wrong because he says: There is no absolute rent because value and cost price are altogether identical, both in industry and in agriculture. On the contrary, agriculture would belong to an exceptional class of industry, if its value and cost price were identical. (vol. 32 p. 30)@

Here the essential aspect of absolute rent that it can only exist at the historical stage in which the development of agriculture is lower than that of industry, is made clear.

Thus, absolute rent can be eliminated if the land is nationalized or if the lagging of agriculture is overcome?although in Japan today it is almost impossible to realize this. However, differential rent cannot be eliminated under capitalism since it is determined by more fundamental capitalistic laws. For example, even if gthe State appropriated the land and capitalist production continued, then rent from II, III, IV (Marx defined I as inferior land, and labeled II, III and IV according to increases in strength) would be paid to the state, but rent as such would remain.h (vol. 31 p. 335) That is, even if the productive power of agriculture were to increase to the point that it was equal to or greater than that of industry, absolute rent could disappear while differential rent would remain.

However, if capitalistic production were abolished, that is socialism were organized, then differential rent would also disappear. Already in the previous section we quoted a passage from Capital in which landed property was called ga false social valueh since a 240 shillings value of products can be sold for 600 shillings, that is a excess profit (differential rent) of 360 shillings. In that same section, Marx wrote that if socialism were realized gsociety would therefore not purchase this product at 2.5 times the actual labor-time contained in it (crops),h (p. 799) and he says nearly the same thing in Theories of Surplus Value:@

[D]ifferential rent is linked with the regulation of the market price and therefore disappears along with the price and with capitalist production. There would remain only the fact that land of varying fertility is cultivated by social labor and, despite the difference in the labor employed, labor can become more productive on all types of land. But the amount of labor used on the worse land would by no means result in more labor being paid for [the product] of the better land as now with the bourgeois. Rather would the labor saved on IV be used for the improvement of III and that saved from III for the improvement of II and finally that saved on II would be used to improve I. Thus the whole of the capital eaten up by the landowners would serve to equalize the labor used for the cultivation of the soil and to reduce the amount of labor in agriculture as a whole. (vol. 31 p. 337)@

Of course, when capitalism is overcome it will not only be differential but also rent in general?rent in all its forms?that will disappear (as well as the general appropriation of surplus-labor). Even though absolute rent has the potential to be eliminated even on a foundation of capitalistic production, this does not mean that it would in reality. In fact, rent overall is only realistic as absolute rent plus differential rent.

Up to now we have mainly discussed the distinction between the different forms of rent, but in conclusion we must emphasize that the three rents, as rent, are essentially identical. Regardless of what form it may take, in the case of rent, landed property receives a special surplus- product from society ggratish on the basis of the right of private ownership. In Marxfs famous section gThe Trinity Formulah there is the following critical section:@

These means of production are in and for themselves, by nature, capital; capital is nothing but a mere eeconomic namef for those means of production; and similarly the earth is in and for itself, by nature, the earth as monopolized by a certain number of landed proprietors. Just as the products become an independent power vis-a-vis the producers in capital and in the capitalist?who is in actual fact nothing but personified capital?so land is personified in the landowner, he is the land similarly standing up on its hind legs and demanding its share, as an independent power, of the products produced with its aid; so that it is not the land that receives the portion of the product needed to replace and increase its productivity, but instead the landowner who receives a share of this product to be sold off and frittered away. It is clear that capital presupposes that labor is wage-labor. It is just as clear, however, that once you proceed form labor as wage-labor, so that the coincidence between wage-labor and labor in general appears self-evident, capital and the monopolized earth must also appear as the natural form of the conditions of labor vis-a-vis labor in general. It now appears as the natural form of the means of labor that they should be capital, as a purely material character which arises from their function in the labor process in general. Capital and produced means of production thus become identical expressions. Likewise land and land monopolized by private property. The means of labor as such, being capital by nature, thus become the source of profit in the same way as the earth as such becomes the source of rent. (vol 3 pp. 963-4)@

Marx clearly says that just as the means of production as capital, which are monopolized, receive a tribute through the right and power of ownership, so does rent?through the monopolized land, i.e. landed property?receive a portion of the products. Moreover, whereas the functional character of capital in the realization of surplus-value is concealed, the relationship wherein landed property as property receives a tribute is perfectly plain and simple.

At the beginning of his theory of ground-rent, Marx clarifies the premise of his discussion of rent. In this part, he says that he will not discuss rent in general but capitalistic ground-rent, and that he will free himself from the many impurities within rent in general (the interest of fixed capital or the deduction from labor) and limit what is considered. Still, he knows that the essence of the problem is that gthe monopoly of a piece of the earth enables the so-called landowner to exact a tribute.h (p. 762) To treat capitalistic ground-rent as rent in general, or dissolve it within it, so as to abandon the particular specific analysis would be a mistake. At the same time, however, not for a moment does Marx doubt that ground-rent is the outcome of landed property that is one form of private ownership. @

Whatever the specific form of rent may be, what all its types have in common is the fact that the appropriation of rent is the economic form in which landed property is realized (and it is explained that the form this property takes can be different and gives historical concrete examples to show this) and that ground-rent in turn presupposes landed property, the ownership of particular bits of the globe by certain individuals. (vol 3 p. 772)@

To understand Marxfs theory of ground-rent it is necessary to be clearly aware of the fact that landowners exploit part or all of the surplus-labor of another person by receiving a tribute of free labor, and therefore this presupposes private ownership in which pieces of the earth are exclusively owned or monopolized. For Marx this was a clear premise, and he saw no need to emphasize this. What he emphasized rather was the mistake of explaining capitalistic rent from landownership in general, thereby overlooking the specific historical character, or differentia specifica, of capitalistic rent. The Uno school distorts the content and development of Marxfs theory of rent, and jettison the radical (fundamental) critical consciousness towards rent (and therefore against the private ownership of land), and speak of a gpure economich theory of rent.

As we have already made clear, capitalistic ground-rent has its own particular economic laws (just as the realization of surplus-value and exploitation of labor do) and it is important to understand them, however one can certainly not forget that gthe fact that the appropriation of rent is the economic form in which landed property is realized and that ground-rent in turn presupposes landed property, the ownership of particular bits of the globe by certain individuals.h (p. 772) Differential ground-rent, not to mention absolute ground-rent, as ground-rent comes down to the power of the private ownership of the land that is in the hands of the landowners, and is its realized geconomic form.h Without the fundamental awareness (criticism) of this private ownership of land, it must be said that a theory of ground-rent is a fraud and ccWe might therefore say that Marxfs theory of ground-rent is the gtheoretical form of self-expressionh of Marx as a communist. Marx wrote the following beautiful passage as a communist, and with it we will bring this article to an end:@

The fact that it is only the title a number of people have to property in the earth that enables them to appropriate a part of societyfs surplus labor as tributec[The title] was entirely created by the relations of production. Once these have reached the point where they have to be sloughed off, then the material source, the economically and historically justified source of the title that arises from the process of lifefs social production, disappears, and with it all transactions based on it. From the standpoint of higher socio-economic formation, the private property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private property of one man in other men. Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the earth. They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias. (p. 911)

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