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JCP "Theories" of Socialism
(From the
Denial of Historical Materialism to Agnosticism)
Written by Kennichi Suzuki
(1997)
Translated by Roy West
Contents
Introduction
In the January to March issues of [the JCP's monthly journal] Keizai
(Economy), Kikunami Hiroshi discusses the theme: "Thinking About Socialism" in
an interview. The apparent purpose of these articles is to explain how the JCP
should look back or summarize its former view of the Soviet Union and "theory of
socialism", and how to evaluate the former Soviet Union from their "present-day
arrival point". These articles are of particular interest because Mr. Kikunami,
who now appears to be the chairman of the JCP policy committee, was for many
years a fervent proponent and interpreter of the JCP's former theory of a
"formative-period of socialism".
In this article we will also look at the
views of JCP chairman Fuwa Tetsuzo (expressed in his essay "The Present-Day
Development of Our Programmatic Line-On the Revisions From the 20th Party
Congress"; presented over five issues of the JCP's theoretical journal Zen'ei
(Vanguard) starting in January 1995), which is likely the basis for Kikunami's
own views. Of course, in order to verify his "consistency", we will also refer
to some of Kikunami's earlier writings. The quotations from the three recent
interviews with Kikunami are referred to as #1, #2, and #3.
"Present-day" Arrival Point of the JCP's Theory
of Socialism-The Presupposition that the USSR was a Socialist
System
Before considering Kikunami's statements, for
the sake of younger readers I would like to briefly look back at the JCP's
theory of the Soviet Union (socialism). This should help clarify the
"difference" between their past and "present-day" point of arrival.
For
the reconstructed postwar JCP, led by Tokuda Ky?ichi and Shiga Yoshio on the
fundamental basis of the 1932 Comintern Thesis on Japan(*1), it was assumed that
the Soviet Union was socialist. The Soviet Communist Party and Stalin were the
object of reverence and worship. In the [JCP daily newspaper] Akahata (Red
Banner) at the time, Stalin's birthday was greeted ever year with enormous
headlines praising Stalin as "our great leader". This was almost identical to
the worship of Kim Il Sung and Kim Chong-Il in North Korea.
(*1)There
were several Comintern Thesis on Japan in the prewar period that strongly
influenced the JCP's program. The 1932 Thesis stressed that the "path to the
dictatorship of the proletariat can only be through a bourgeois-democratic
revolution", and that this revolution would have a "tendency to grow rapidly
into a socialist revolution".
The postwar JCP inherited, almost
unchanged, the 1932 Comintern thesis which defined the Japanese revolution as a
"democratic revolution", and spread the fantasy about a "peaceful revolution
under the occupation". Consequently, they not only squandered the best
opportunity for postwar revolution, but also channeled the rising class
struggles of the workers into a dead-end. With the intensification of the Cold
War, the collapse of the daydream of "peaceful revolution", and the Cominform's
criticism of the JCP, the party suddenly split in 1950, and the Tokuda
"Mainstream faction", supported by Stalin, grabbed the leadership amidst a
gruesome, unremitting factional fight with Miyamoto Kenji's "International
faction". When Secretary-General Miyamoto (at the time) was finally able to gain
control of the reins of power with the death of Stalin and Tokuda and
Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin, the Hungarian uprising broke out. The JCP's
reaction to this uprising vividly revealed the Stalinist nature of this
party.
The Hungarian uprising from October to November 1956, like the
Poznan riots in Poland several months earlier, was a rebellion against the
exploitation and repression of the workers by the Stalinist Communist Party
bureaucracy. When this uprising was crushed by the Soviet tanks, it was a
serious blow and setback for Communist Parties throughout the world. In Japan,
and many other economically developed countries, this marked, at least among
advanced workers and students, the beginning of opposition to the JCP, or a
distancing from the party, and was the starting point for the building of a new
workers party.
But the consistent attitude of the JCP at the time was to
call the Hungarian uprising "counter-revolutionary", and express overall support
for the Soviet repression. After initially maintaining a baffled silence, some
evasive editorials were written in Akahata, but with the success of Soviet
suppression, the pages were filled with headlines such as "Oppose Imperialist
Intervention In Hungary", or "Crush The Counter-Revolution In
Hungary".
Secretary-General Miyamoto, who was establishing his position
as the top leader of the JCP, also denounced the Hungarian uprising as
counter-revolutionary, while arguing for the firm unity of the party. According
to Miyamoto, one of the reasons that the uprising occurred was that "the
Hungarian Communist Party was not internally united, and the Party's internal
arguments were taken outside and utilized by counter-revolutionary forces". As a
result, "problems which should naturally be solved by socialistic, democratic
methods led to violent struggles for counter revolutionary purposes." Miyamoto
concluded that, "a system must be maintained whereby we can strengthen unity and
uphold the party laws, while correcting flaws through the power of unity."(*2)
This is the main lesson that he drew from the Hungarian incident. What a fitting
"summation" for a Stalinist party bureaucrat.
(*2)Miyamoto Kenji,
"Hangarii mondai wo ikani hy?ka suru ka [How to Evaluate the Hungarian Problem]
(Zen'ei, February 1957).
The subsequent change in the JCP's view of the
Hungarian uprising can be seen in their Sixty-Year History of Japanese Communist
Party, published in July 1982 to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the
party's foundation. Here the uprisings in Poland and Hungary are placed side by
side in the following context:
In some socialist countries in Eastern
Europe, working people rose in a struggle against the pressure of Soviet
great-power hegemonism over the years, and against bureacraticism associated
with it, resulting in a critical situation.(*3)
(*3)Central Committee
Japanese Communist Party, Sixty-Year History of the Japanese Communist Party
1922-1982 (Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1984), p. 194The Hungarian uprising is
then described in the following way:
Concerning the "Hungarian incident",
there are a large number of materials and testimonies available, published over
more than twenty years. Not only was the JCP subject to historical restrictions
because the incident occurred before the Seventh JCP Congress was held, but it
also had no direct means of obtaining correct information. The statements made
by the JCP at that time therefore, under these circumstances must be the subject
of re-examination, based on our achievements in the independent study of
international politics so far.(*4)
(*4)Ibid., p. 195.Even at the beginning of
the eighties, more than "twenty years" after the Hungarian uprising, the JCP
merely suggests that "materials" and "testimonies" should be "the subject of
re-examination", and are unable to clearly give an overview of their former
standpoint. What a pathetic "vanguard".
In the Sixty-five Year History of
the Japanese Communist Party, published in March 1988, perhaps because they
finally got hold of these elusive "materials and testimonies", their description
is more detailed and their evaluation is different. According to this new
account:
The demands and the movement of the Hungarian people stemmed
from a desire for national freedom from Soviet hegemonism and a multi-party
political system. Even though this included some maneuvers by reactionary
elements, on the whole it could not be called a counter-revolutionary scheme
from abroad. In the Hungarian incident, the Soviet military action was an
interventionist act which ran counter to the principles of socialism and the
rights of self-determination.(*5)
(*5)Translated from Japanese edition of
Sixty-Five Year History of the Japanese Communist Party, pp. 154-5.This is a
liberalist account of the "demands and movement of the Hungarian people" that
reveals the fundamental limitations of the JCP. Notwithstanding this, however,
they are essentially denying their former view that the struggles of the
Hungarian people were "counter-revolutionary actions". From this, the question
naturally arises of how to view the actions of then Secretary-General Miyamoto,
and other JCP leaders should be evaluated However, no such consideration or
self-criticism is present in the Sixty-Five Year History of the Japanese
Communist Party. This is the sort of self-transformation on the installment plan
that the JCP favors. Irresponsible and opportunism truly run to the marrow of
this party.
The theory of the
"Formative-Period of Socialism"
The Communist Party
set out its theory of the "formative-period of socialism" at its 14th Party
Congress:
The world-historic transition from capitalism to socialism is
to be effected as a process by which countries that have already taken the road
of socialism advance to full-fledged development, overcoming their historic
constraints; the process by which the peoples of various capitalist countries
start on the road of socialist transition to attain full socialist development,
suited to their own countries, via the route of democratic transition and so on,
and the process by which the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America break
free of the domination of new and old colonialism and take the road to national
self-determination and social progress under the conditions that are peculiar to
each, with their own respective forms. It is necessary for us to grasp the
following point from the principled viewpoint of scientific socialism: All these
processes combine to form a mighty current. Only by combining these processes
can socialism free itself of initial formation, and reach a new stage in which
socialism can give full play to its inherit superiority and
vitality.(*6)
(*6)"Resolution of the 14th Congress of the JCP", quoted from
Sixty Year History, p. 517.It should be noted here that at the basis of this
"definition" of the "formation-period socialism" theory is the assumption that
the USSR, China and Eastern European countries are "socialist states". Since
various "negative phenomena" could not be denied outright, they attempt to
"explain" this with the idea that they stem from the "formative-stage", i.e. the
development stage. This can be easily understood from Chairman Miyamoto's
address to the congress:
In the long history of mankind, only one and a
half centuries have passed since the birth of the communist concept, and it is
only sixty years since the first socialist country was established, and in this
sense the progress made by mankind over this period is very great. But, taking a
broad view of history, we see that the socialist world is still in its infancy,
with a great number of countries still capitalist. It would be childish to feel
despair over the fact that the ideals of communism, cherished by the originators
of theories of scientific socialism or communism, have not yet bloomed
fully.(*7)
(*7)Ibid., p. 517.This inane theory was then defended for twenty
years as the official view of the JCP, and Fuwa and Kikunami produced a
rhetorical flood to defend and explain this theory.
"The USSR wasn't Socialist at
all"?
However, at the Twentieth Party Congress, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fuwa Tetsuzo stated in his Chairman' Report,
that the Soviet Union was "neither a socialist society, nor a society in a
transition to socialism". The JCP Central Committee member Adachi Masatsune's
"explained" the decision of the Twentieth Congress and its significance as
having "a great impact both inside and outside the party". According to Adachi,
after studying and discussing the resolutions of the Congress, many responded
that "it made them happy to be JCP members", or that "it renewed their pride and
confidence as party members":
One of the problems which raised the
liveliest discussion and made a strong impression on party members was the
Congress elucidation of the theory of socialism. In the amendment to the Party
program adopted at the Congress, along with the indication that the former
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were hegemonists and bureaucratic
with nothing in common to socialism, was the description that "in these
countries, starting with the revolution, the goal of aiming for socialism was
held out, but because of the mistaken path followed by the leadership, the
society was actually unable to reach socialist society, and met with
dissolution." Moreover, in the "report on the amendment of the program", it was
clarified that the Soviet Union from the time of Stalin "carried out
fundamentally mistaken policies in the realm of economics, and thus the
transitional period that Lenin was striving for thrown was thrown off the
rails", and that "it is obvious that a society cannot be called socialism, or
even a transitional society, if it eliminates people's economic control of
agriculture and industry, oppresses them, and is sustained by a prison labor
force numbering in the hundreds of thousands". Furthermore, while emphasizing
that the JCP's theory of the "formative-period of socialism" elaborated at the
Fourteenth Party Congress represented an independent view at a time when the
Soviet Union and other countries defined themselves as "developed socialism" and
forced this view on other countries, it was still pointed out that "seen from
the present-day, this view that the Soviet Union was, by and large, a historical
transitional society, despite containing many defects and negative phenomena,
lacked clarity". In response to the question, which naturally arose: "what was
Soviet Society then?" the attitude was to "avoid dogmatic schemas" and stress
the importance of concrete, analytical research.(*8)
(*8)Adachi Masatsune,
"Dai nij?kai t?daikai ni miru shakaishugi-ron no hatten" [The Development of the
Theory of Socialism at the Twentieth Party Congress] in Zen'ei February
1994.According to Adachi, this analysis "has great historical significance
internationally" not only in Japan, and the individual response from congress
delegates was that it was "masterful", or that they "received a sort of
intellectual shock", and "the common view was a feeling of relief and sympathy".
He wants to say how great this was for the JCP members, but no matter how much
the JCP is proud of its "monolithic" unity, there is no way that such a
180-degree change cannot cause some friction. Let's listen to some more of his
report:
At the same time, naturally, doubts and questions were raised
concerning the proposal of the Congress. Most fundamentally accepted the
conclusion of the Congress, but said something to the effect that "it was too
sudden to say that the USSR wasn't socialist", or "this contradicted the theory
of the "formative- period theory". A few people reacted by saying "does this
mean that I believed in vain the USSR was socialist" or "why are we saying this
now". There was also some tendency, apart from the overall decisions of the
Congress, to focus on how to view the former Soviet Union.(*9)
(*9)Ibid.Even
Chairman Fuwa recognized the discord within the party, and wrote that, "the
conclusion of the Congress (that the 'USSR was neither socialism nor a
transitional society), led a few to argue 'why wasn't this said thirty years
ago'." But Fuwa quickly added:
However, it is important to note that,
internationally speaking, the JCP showed extreme foresight in developing an
understanding of the hegemonism of the USSR and other errors.(*10)
(*10)Fuwa
Tetsuzo, Zen'ei, January 1995.Fuwa was thus very busy offering up long-winded
explanations, and Kikunami's interview can be viewed as one part of the effort
by the leadership to achieve some consistency in their views.
Did Hegemonism Cause the Collapse of the
USSR?
Kikunami's interview begins with the question
of why the Soviet and Eastern European systems collapsed. His response is that
hegemonism led to the collapse of the Soviet Union:
To start with my
conclusion, for the USSR to hold out, under the international conditions I just
mentioned, the Soviet leadership after Stalin resisted the imperialist
hegemonism with their own hegemonism, and turned into a hegemonic state, this in
turn led to mission to imperialism and self-collapse.(*11)
(*11)Kikunami, #1,
p. 72.This is another fine example the JCP's "scientific socialism"(*12). The
collapse of the USSR is said to have been caused by the "mistaken" ideology of
hegemonism, and foreign policy. No trace of historical materialism can be found
in Kikunami's argument, which explains the collapse and deadlock of the Soviet
state starting from ideology and policies. The ideology and foreign policy of a
state can only be rationally explained-naturally presupposing certain historical
and international conditions-from the class character and internal class
relations of the state in question, not the reverse. The fact that the Soviet
Union pursued a hegemonic course means that it was a bourgeois state, not that
it merely "deviated from the principles of socialism".
(*12)The JCP still
professes, despite all of the evidence to the contrary, that they are upholding
"scientific socialism".
Furthermore, before discussing the "deviation
from the principles of socialism", it is necessary to demonstrate that the
country in question was in fact a socialist state. When discussing the reasons
for the collapse of the Soviet Union, the JCP unconsciously presupposes that the
Soviet Union was socialist, but in fact this contradicts the declaration of
their own Twentieth Congress? Of course, being totally oblivious to his own
opportunism, Kikunami could never realize this. There may be some who would find
nothing wrong with Kikunami's foolish attempt to explain the Soviet Union's
collapse starting from some ideology or another, so let's follow Kikunami's line
of reasoning a bit further.
Kikunami' criticizes Gorbachev's "New
Thinking" which advocated the peaceful co-existence of the two systems in order
to end "class conflict and the confrontation of social systems" and bring about
the formation of a "new civilized" society. For Kikunami, this represented a
"political and ideological" submission to imperialism", which "led to the
avalanche-like self-collapse of the Soviet Union":
The core of the
problem is that, from the time of Stalin, the Soviet leadership ignored the
power of the people, turned into a great-power hegemonic state, and finally
submitted to imperialism, this indeed led to "self-collapse". The collapse of
the Soviet Union was the failure of Soviet hegemonism.(*13)
(*13)Ibid., p.
76.
The leadership itself self-collapsed ideologically, and their power
was crushed. On this point, the human causes of the Soviet collapse are
extremely important."(*14)
(*14)Ibid., p. 80.As we can see, Kikunami declares
that the USSR collapsed because its leadership fell into hegemonism and
"ideologically self-destructed". Someone who explains the collapse of the USSR
from an "ideological breakdown", will naturally seek the cause of this collapse
in "human factors". This is historical idealism, needless to say, and opens the
path to arbitrary explanations of history, such as the idea that the Soviet
Union would not have collapsed had its leaders been more ideologically sound or
intellectually firm.
There may be some who think that Kikunami is trying
to say that hegemonism sped up the Soviet Union's military expansionism, and
hastened its collapse by worsening its contradictions. Certainly, Kikunami does
say something to this effect (especially in the second interview). But this
still does not dissolve the problem. Hegemonism is not simply a problem of the
Soviet Union, but is rather a line "applied" or inevitable path taken by more or
less all bourgeois states, particularly large bourgeois states. Today the United
States is openly declaring its supremacy, and recently China is advancing an
open hegemonism. It is also well known that Japan is burning with a desire to
establish hegemony in Asia. But these countries are not necessarily on the verge
of collapse, and this reveals the falseness of the idea that hegemonism could be
the direct cause of a state's collapse.
Of course, hegemonism can
certainly deepen the contradictions of a system, but if it is linked to the
collapse of a system this is due to the internal factors are the cause of
collapse. In other words, within a system there are elements which make
hegemonism necessary, these deepen the system's contradictions, and prepare
(speed) its collapse, but it is historical idealism to separate hegemonism from
the socio- economic foundation of the system, and view it as the cause of a
system's collapse. Kikunami's discussion is nothing but idealistic, moralistic
prattle. The issue is what makes hegemonism necessary, how do the internal
contradictions of a country lead to the collapse of the system. Kikunami has not
even one word to say on this essential point.
Evaluation of the Russian Revolution and NEP
In the second interview, Kikunami talks about the "domestic factors in
the collapse of the USSR and Eastern Europe", but this only exposes the
arbitrariness of the JCP's theory. Kikunami "spent four years (1960-64) living
in the Soviet Union", during which time he found it a monotonous society, and
felt some doubts about a country that only reported goals of production that
were achieved. (He triumphantly says in the interview that when he visited East
Germany in 1972, he had the "intuition" that "if this country relaxed it would
probably collapse". A very easy thing to say in hindsight!) His recollections
reveal that while he had serious misgivings, he clung to "common sense" instead
of thoroughly investigating the matter.
Kikunami offers a pathetic
"historical overview" by dividing the history of the Soviet Union into four
periods. According to his account, the Russian Revolution was a "socialist
revolution", the period of NEP was "a very active society" in which "a
government aiming for socialism implemented policies for workers and Russia was
full of a new spirit of the people."(*14) However, as we have repeatedly
indicated, the class character of the Russian Revolution cannot be defined
simply as a "socialist revolution". In a late developing country such as Russia,
where the peasantry made up eighty percent of the population, the revolution was
not "socialist", in the full meaning of the word, in terms of socio-economic
content, and could only be a democratic revolution of the workers and peasants.
The fact that the Russia Revolution contained proletarian socialist elements
stemming from the fact that the workers assumed hegemony, does not change the
socio-economic character of the revolution.
(*15)Kikunami, #2, pp.
108-9.
If one defines the Russian Revolution, without reservation, as a
"socialist revolution", why did the development of productive power through NEP
(i.e. capitalism), and the establishment of state capitalism become a real task?
Furthermore, how can one account for the reversal from "wartime communism" to
NEP? Kikunami does not even consider these obvious questions. To use a
paradoxical expression, after the October "socialist" revolution in Russia, the
large-scale development of capitalism had to begin.
We must point also
out that the NEP period cannot be glorified in the manner of Kikunami.
Certainly, by means of NEP the Soviet economy, which had collapsed from internal
and foreign war, was able at last to begin its revival, but in this process
there was also an intensification of contradictions, such as the growing
disequilibrium between agriculture and industry, a drop in the price of
agricultural goods relative to industrial articles (scissors crisis), the class
stratification of the peasantry with the expansion of the power of rich peasants
(kulaks), the Nepmen's intrigues and speculative activity, etc. These
contradictions of NEP were reflected within the Soviet Communist Party in the
form of the bitter debate over the line of industrialization, and the
corresponding development of factional struggles. It was the development under
NEP of these internal contradictions of Russian society that led to the forced
establishment of state capitalism under Stalin.
It is natural that
Kikunami, who one-dimensionally glorifies NEP with no awareness of its internal
contradictions, is only able to moralistically criticize Stalin for violently
ending NEP and collectivizing agriculture thereby suddenly changing Soviet
society (or to borrow the expression from the interview: "this threw Soviet
Society off the track of a transitional period aiming for socialism"). Kikunami
"defines" the Stalinist system as "a despotic and bureaucratic system", but
leaves it at that. This is his only definition, and he has nothing to say about
the historical and class nature of this system! What he calls "scientific
socialism" is crude beyond belief.
He goes on to describe Soviet society
after Stalin as "having no internal drive to develop productive power", "piling
up waste and inefficiency and a widening black-market economy", "turning its
back on science and technology", and as "a stagnant society lacking
democracy".(*16) What more could he possibly say? But even while providing a
detailed list of the "limitations" and "defects" of Soviet society, he seems to
be unaware (perhaps intentionally) that he is exposing his own ignorance for
formerly championing this country as an example of socialist
society.
(*16)Ibid., p. 112.
Kikunami's "Overview" of the "Formative-Stage" Theory
The development
of human cognition?
In the third interview, Kikunami
finally responds to the question of "what sort of system the USSR was exactly"
and explains the "arrival point" of the Twentieth Party Congress which declared:
"the Soviet Union was unable to reach socialism, and by creating the Stalinist
system through the violent interruption of NEP, this society, from the time of
Stalin, strayed from the transitional period aiming for socialism". Kikunami
then responds to the "penetrating question" of the relationship between this
theory and the former "formative-period theory of socialism". The following
passages should be remembered as a testament to Kikunami's (and the JCP's)
confusion:
I think this is related to the development of people's
understanding since the collapse of the Soviet Union. At least this is the case
for me. Previously I thought that there was no reason to think that the Soviet
Union was not socialist. Of course, even though I thought the USSR was
socialism, I did not think or say that it was a "model" of socialism, or at
least not once I had started to seriously think (?!) about
socialism.(*17)
(*17)Kikunami, #3, p. 100.It seems that Mr. Kikunami did "not
seriously think about socialism" until the Soviet Union collapsed. He had been
convinced that the USSR was socialist and had announced this, but now he seems
to have finally realized his error. However, since it is rather uncomfortable to
directly admit this, he instead talks about the "development of people's
understanding" since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Kikunami displays
a pride in a "displaying a sort of decisiveness and ability to discriminate". He
admits his error, but without any trace of self-criticism or serious reflection.
In fact, when Kikunami says, "in the past I said this and advanced the theory of
a 'formative-period', so I unequivocally, and clearly decided that there was a
need for adjustments [in the theory]"(*18) Since today there can no longer be
"adjustments" made, his "decisiveness" can only mean throwing this theory away.
Kikunami continues:
(*18)Ibid., p. 101.
From the seventies, this question
(how to evaluate the Soviet Union) was seriously discussed, theoretically and
academically", before that time the question of whether the USSR was socialism
did not even enter into discussion, it was a matter of common
sense.(*19)
(*19)Ibid.What nonsense! The question of how to evaluate the USSR
dates all the way back to the time of Trotsky, and was discussed in the postwar
period in the fifties and sixties by Tsushima Tadayuki, Tony Cliff and others,
but the JCP simply ignored these debates. Kikunami's "criticism" of Trotsky or
Tsushima boils down to the fact that he never "seriously" engaged with their
arguments. It is upsetting to hear him go so far as to say that it was "common
knowledge" that the Soviet Union was socialism. For Kikunami, if something is
not discussed within the Communist Party, it simply does not exist. This brings
to mind the expression "the frog in the well knows nothing of the great ocean".
Kikunami argues that since objectively it was "common knowledge" that the Soviet
Union was socialist, the JCP also followed this "common knowledge". The problem
thus lies with "common sense", not the Communist Party. What a lovely theory.
But already "common knowledge" is not the truth or science. Science begins with
the questioning of common sense. Or is Kikunami saying that the job for
theorists of "scientific socialism" is to simply follow "common sense"? If this
were so there would be absolutely no need for such theorists in the first
place.
The Role of the
"Formative-Period" Theory
Kikunami goes on to defend
the theory of the "formative-period of socialism" saying that it "was the
foundation for a coolheaded criticism of the Soviet Union", but despite the
amendment of the term "formative-period", he still committed a fundamental
mistake in evaluating the Soviet Union as "socialism". Here we will look at
recent JCP statements concerning the theory of a "formative-period of
socialism". Fuwa, for example, offers the self-flattering idea that "our party's
theory of a 'formative-period' of socialism had resounding significance within
the world communist movement which was dominated from the time of Stalin by the
theory of the "completion of socialism". He then speaks of the "significance"
and "limitations" of the JCP's theory:
This theory of the "formative"
period played an extremely important role internationally, and was the
independent insight of the JCP. However, from the perspective of the position
reached today, it has major theoretical limitations. This is because it adopted
the view that the Soviet Union, although full of negative phenomena resulting
from many mistakes and deviations, was ultimately a society belonging to a
"transitional period" to socialism.(*20)
(*20)Fuwa, p. 36.Cunning Mr. Fuwa
has replaced the "formative-period of socialism" with "a society belonging to a
'transitional period' to socialism". But regardless of whether the embarrassing
term to be carefully avoided is "transitional period" or "formative-period", he
still basically evaluated the Soviet Union as "socialism", and the question of
the objective meaning of this word remains.
Here must also reluctantly
take a look at the past statements of Mr. Kikunami. Beginning in the eighties,
Kikunami argued against the "socialist economist" Nagasuna Minoru, and defended
the theory of a "formative-period".(*21) This debate itself doesn't amount to
much, and the views of Kikunami can be evaluated at a glance. Nagasuna (relying
on Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme) argued that the "formative-period
theory" amounted to nothing more than an understanding of the current situation
which can explain the develop- mental stage of various countries as a
"traditional developmental stage theory", but cannot explain the particular
developmental stage of socialism in each country, and it is correct to define
the contemporary Soviet Union as a "maturing and developing socialism" with
remnants of backwardness (in other words he defended the standpoint of the
Soviet Communist Party).
(*21)Kikunami, "Nihon ky?sant? no shakaishugi
"seiseiki" ron hihansha e no kait?" [A Response to a Critic of the JCP's Theory
of a "Formative-Period" of Socialism], in Zen'ei, March 1982.
Kikunami
countered with the argument that the "standpoint which defines the developmental
stage of each country by focusing on the degree of the socialization of the
means of production" was insufficient, and that the developmental stage of
productive power must also be considered. On this point, he said that the Soviet
Union was backward, and could not be called "developed socialism" (to prove this
backwardness Kikunami mentioned all sorts of statistics related to the
productive power of steel, cement, and electric power).
On the other
hand, however, Kikunami emphasized that the Soviet Union was a society with
socialized means of production and no exploitation. He stressed that there is
great historical significance in the fact that private ownership of the means of
production has fundamentally been abolished, and production relations have been
established which do not require exploitation:
One certainly cannot
overlook the fact that relations of exploitation have been abolished in the
Soviet Union by establishing the social ownership of the means of
production.(*22)
(*22)Ibid., p. 121.In other words, Kikunami claims that in
the USSR the means of production were socialized and exploitation abolished, but
because the level of productive power was lower than that of advanced Western
capitalist states, it could not be called "developed capitalism", and instead
should be called a "formative-period of socialism". He expressed this idea
directly in the following passage:
This particular backwardness and
difficulties have marked the present-day socialist countries with many
complicated limitations and characteristics. This has created a special
circumstance wherein even though, in line with the critical examination of
Nagasuna, the socialization of the means of production has been "100%"
established, productive power still lags behind the level of advanced capitalist
countries.(*23)
(*23)Ibid., pp. 115-6.Kikunami, as he states later in the
interview, has now changed his view of the socialization of the means of
production, but his statement above clearly shows that, at least in terms of his
official statements, the theory of a "formative-period of socialism" defended
and beautified the Soviet system. If a distinction were to be drawn between the
theory of "developed socialism" and the theory of a "formative-period", it would
only be that the former openly beautified the Soviet Union, while the latter is
a shamefaced or hidden glorification of the Soviet Union.
The theory of a
"formative-period of socialism" is not only a beautification of the USSR in this
fundamental sense. That is, along with pointing out the difficulties and
contradictions of the "formative- period", this theory also often emphasized the
system's "affirmative aspects" as socialism. For example, in speaking of the
"formative- period of socialism", Miyamoto often mentioned "positive aspects"
such as the comprehensive welfare system, free education, and social security.
In speaking of East Germany, Kikunami also added:
Of course, there are
many things that were better in East Germany than West Germany. Education was
free up to the university level, and there was a good system of social security
and welfare. When we spoke of the systematic superiority, we were referring to
these aspects. [Today after the collapse of East Germany] Everybody does not now
have social security or welfare.(*24)
(*24)Kikunami, #1, p. 68.From these
sorts of statements, it is clear that the theory of the "formative-period of
socialism", on the whole, served the role of glorifying Soviet
society.
This theory of the "formative-period of socialism", as we
already mentioned, was first introduced at the Fourteenth Party Congress in
1977. Already by this time (to borrow the description of Kikunami), "to serious
debates in Japan and throughout the world over the nature of the Soviet Union
arose in the wake of such events as the intensification of Sino-Soviet conflict,
the extreme violent destructive interference towards the JCP, the Soviet
attitude towards the Vietnam War, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and armed
repression of the revived socialist movement there, Roy Medvedev's revelation of
Stalin's mass oppression (published in Japan from 1973-77), the exposure of the
kolhozy and other internal conditions, the stagnation of the Soviet economy and
debates over profit". Needless to say, these are important questions (with the
exception of the question of "intervention" in JCP affairs) which fundamentally
called into question the theory of Soviet socialism. Nevertheless, the JCP was
content to simply counter the theory of "developed socialism" with their theory
of the "formative-period of socialism". One can see the JCP's theoretical
superficiality and insensitivity to reality in their tendency to cling to the
Stalinist dogmas, to which they constantly adjusted.
The Denial of State Capitalism and the
Agnosticism Tendency
Kikunami's discussion of the socialization of
production
We have already touched on Kikunami's
view, expressed in his theory of the "formative-stage of socialism", that the
means of production were "100%" socialized in the Soviet Union. But recently
Kikunami is saying that the nationalization of the means of production does not
necessarily signify socialization if the workers are not in control of
production. It should be immediately clear from a glance at the reality of
monopoly capitalism and state monopoly capitalism today that the nationalization
of the means of production does not signify "socialization". At the beginning of
the twentieth century, national companies appeared in many capitalist countries,
but this did not in any way change the fact that these were capitalist
countries. What then is the substance of Kikunami's understanding of the
socialization of production? Let's listen to his explanation:
The
socialization of the means of production means that they change from the private
ownership of capitalists to become the possession of the nation. They once again
become the possession of society. However, this is not merely an economic act. I
have thought about this for some time. The state which acquires the means of
production must be a democratic state of the workers. If this is not the case
and the state is anti-democratic, no matter what form of nationalization occurs,
the means of production will not become the possession of the citizens, and will
not be socialized.(*25)
(*25)Kikunami, #3, p. 105.At a glance this may appear
to be a plausible explanation, but in fact it contains an ambiguity that leads
to opportunism. As Engels' pointed out, the capitalist mode of production
"forces on more and more the transformation of the vast means of production,
already socialized, into state property"(*26) , but overall socialization is
only possible through the establishment of proletarian political power. And this
power, or workers' state, is at the same time a state that is "withering
away":
(*26)Engels, Anti-Duhring p. 267
The proletariat seizes
political power and turns the means of production in the first instance into
state property. But, in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat,
abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, abolishes also the state
as state.(*27)
(*27)Ibid.
The state was the official representative of
society as a whole; the gathering of it together into a visible embodiment. But
it was only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself
represented, for the time being, society as a whole: in ancient times, the state
of slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, the feudal lords; in our time, the
bourgeoisie. When at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of
society, it renders itself unnecessary. As soon as there is no longer any social
class to be held in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the individual
struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production, with the
collisions and excesses arising from these, are removed, nothing more remains to
be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary.
The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the
representative of the whole of society-the taking into possession of the means
of production in the name of society-that is, at the same time, its last
independent act as a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in
one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the
government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the
conduct of processes of production. The state is not 'abolished'. It dies
out.(*28)
(*28)Ibid., pp. 267-68.Proletarian power abolishes the private
ownership of the means of production in "the first act by virtue of which the
state really constitutes itself as the representative of the whole of
society-the taking into possession of the means of production in the name of
society", and thus turns into a sort of socio-economic organization to shoulder
"the administration of things" and the "processes of production".
This
essential point is not clear in Kikunami's "explanation". While he talks about
the socialization of the means of production and proletarian political power
(workers' state), and the fact that this state is already not a state in the
original sense, but a "half-state" which is "dying out", he makes absolutely no
mention that the private ownership of the means of production is abolished and
class divisions overcome. For him the task is not a proletarian revolution to
establish the power of a workers' state, but democratic reforms to "democratize"
the state and society. His explanation of the socialization of the means of
production is a sort of cunning maneuver to replace social revolution with
social reform.
From Historical
Idealism to Know-Nothingism
Kikunami's "Present-day" point of
arrival
At the very end of the interview, Kikunami
finally mentions the theory of state capitalism. But nothing he says is clear,
and after saying that it is not this or that, or commenting on how it is "a
difficult question", he ultimately denies the theory of state capitalism. After
very briefly introducing Lenin and Plekhanov's theories of state capitalism, he
sums up "the current theory of state capitalism" in the following
way:
There are many differences in the basis of theories of state
capitalism today, but they are generally characterized by the definition of the
"workers being directly engaged in wage labor" or the relationship between the
directors of state enterprises and workers being one of wage-workers. So instead
of describing the method of production as capitalistic, they define it as being
capitalism itself. The basic characteristic of the theory of state capitalism,
despite various nuances, is that the means of production were nationalized, but
it was capitalism dominated by wage labor.(*29)
(*29)Kikunami, #3, p. 112.In
response to the interviewer's query of Kikunami's personal view, he
answers:
That's a difficult one. To speak of wage labor assumes the
existence of a bourgeois class on the other hand. But there is the question of
whether this class really existed in the USSR? For this reason, one cannot
easily say whether the term wage-workers should be used or not. Certainly there
were wage-worker-like conditions. But the main question is whether or not the
workers were the masters of production. I think that the Soviet Union was a
society ruled by the bureaucracy-a bureaucratic layer with special privileges.
Even if one uses the word class, this does not mean that they were the owners of
the means of production.(*30)
(*30)Ibid.What Kikunami is saying boils down to
the idea that the workers "worked under wage-worker-like conditions" but he
can't be sure if they should be defined as wage-workers, and the bureaucracy
ruled the society, but he can't be sure if they should be called a bourgeoisie
("difficult questions"!). We have already fully examined and solved the question
of the relationship between capital and wage labor in the USSR and the position
of the bureaucracy over thirty years ago when we established our theory of state
capitalism. To repeat this here would be a waste of time. One need only refer to
Hayashi's long essay on the Soviet System(*31), and subsequent
writings.
(*31)See chapter 6.
The interviewer mentioned that there "is
a view that state capitalism must be understood in the historical process as a
way for backward countries to industrialize", but Kikunami made a quick getaway
by mumbling that it would be inappropriate to say that state capitalism was
inevitable for industrial construction since this would imply that the Stalinist
system was "inevitable". The following passage clearly shows that Kikunami
understands nothing about the essence of the problem:
It is a fact that
the October Revolution aimed for socialism. So from the viewpoint of historical
materialism, it would be strange to say that state capitalism came about through
this, and that this then became actual capitalism.(*32)
(*32)Ibid., p. 114.As
we pointed out above, in terms of its socio-economic content, the Russian
Revolution-due to the late developmental stage of Russian society-was not a
"socialist revolution", and there was no choice but to propel forward commodity
production and distribution and "guide this along the rails of state capitalism"
(Lenin). The subsequent development in Russia shows that state capitalism could
not stop at the level of capitalism controlled and regulated by the workers' and
peasants' state as Lenin had thought. State capitalism was established as a
system that encompassed the entire society through the nationalization of all
industry and forced agricultural collectivization. Furthermore, because the
Russian system took the form of state capitalism (a particular type of
capitalism), liberalization became necessary, and the collapse of the Soviet
Union meant that this suppressed bourgeois nature could develop overall. This is
in fact the consistent viewpoint of historical materialism. Kikunami denies the
theory of state capitalism, but is completely unable to answer the question of
how to positively define the Soviet system:
In terms of how to define the
economic social structure of the USSR, as I said before, this is difficult
[fourth time-Suzuki]. At the Twentieth Party Congress, Chairman Fuwa said that
"there were no restrictions on scientific research at this point", and adopted
the attitude of leaving the serious study to those who wish to undertake it. I
think this is a very wise attitude. However, he added that "phrasing the
question in terms of a choice between socialism or capitalism is not a
scientific approach", and stressed that it was necessary to take a wider view
and avoid being dogmatic or schematic. I think that this is the most important
thing to remember when looking at the complex Soviet
society.(*33)
(*33)Ibid., pp. 114-5.Here Kikunami sounds quite
self-important, but he is basically just admitting that he doesn't know how the
Soviet system should be defined. He really is taking his joke too far, however,
when he says that Soviet society is a "complex" enigma so one should not fall
into the standpoint of saying whether it was capitalism or socialism. Since the
October revolution, the Russian "socialist system" lasted for more than seventy
years as an "economic social structure". A political party unable to
scientifically elucidate this system certainly cannot hold up the banner of
"scientific socialism". When faced with this important problem that lies at the
heart of the essence of contemporary society, for a political party to simply
say that it is a difficult question, amounts to their own self-negation. After
confessing that he had "no conclusion to present to this difficult [fifth time!]
problem", Kikunami goes on to say:
I don't think that it is possible
understand the Soviet Union by squeezing a complex society into one category-for
example, state capitalism, semi-feudal society, or slave society, etc. The only
thing that can be done is to view it in its totality just as it is. This may
seem evasive [it sure is!-Suzuki], but I don't think there is any better
way.(*34)
(*34)Ibid., p. 115.I also frankly think that from the perspective
of historical materialism it is not necessarily a requirement to define each
type of economic social system.
This is the end of the interview.
Kikunami sidesteps the question of his own incompetence, and plainly states that
from the "perspective of historical materialism" no definition of the USSR is
needed, or it should be "viewed in its totality just as it is" (i.e. it is
alright to grasp a phenomenon simply as a phenomenon). Needless to say, this
represents a denial of historical materialism and a refuge in Kantian
agnosticism and reveals the degree of the JCP's theoretical decay. This
self-proclaimed party of "scientific socialism" is now clearly traveling on a
road leading to its own "self-destruction".
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