Lenin's “Own Words”(Part Three: Philosophy and Worldview)

7. On Materialist Philosophy

Marxism is Materialism

“Marxism is materialism. As such, it is as relentlessly hostile to religion as was the materialism of the eighteenth century Encyclopaedists or the materialism of Feuerbach. This is beyond doubt. But the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels goes further than the Encyclopaedists and Feuerbach, for it applies the materialist philosophy to the do main of history, to the domain of the social sciences.” (“The Attitude of the Workers’ Party to Religion,” Collected Works vol. 15, p. 405.)

Marxism is, above all, materialism. In other words, it recognizes the “unity of the world in its materiality” (Engels). Materialism, particularly in the modern era, is the only philosophy that consistently opposes religion, superstition, and ideological.. Marxism is based on the tradition of all materialism, from that of the Ancient Greeks up to the modern era, and has developed this materialism. Marxism holds up the banner of materialism, and there can be no ambiguity towards this point.

Marxism, however, is not merely materialism, and is not the old 18th century metaphysical materialism, but first of all dialectical materialism, and we will look more closely at dialectics in the following chapter. Second of all, Marxism is materialism extended to the principles of the historical development of human society, and therefore a materialism that is fundamental and inclusive. In other words, the most crucial content of Marxist philosophy is dialectical materialism (see ch. 10).

The French revolutionary materialism of the 18th century had two fundamental defects. The greatest defect was its metaphysical character, and the other was that it was “not fully clothed,” that is, the fact that an idealistic approach was taken to human history and society. In terms of its view of society, the French materialism adopted the standpoint of humanism. This was the view that human beings are one part of nature, and when materialistically considering human beings they must be seen as one part of nature and subordinated to the laws of nature. To construct a science of society it was felt necessary, above all, to study the human being, understanding human beings’ needs and desires, and in this way something social was ultimately reduced to something individual. Moreover, in posing the problem in terms of human nature as one part of nature, it was emphasized as being something unchanging, while the development of society was ignored. Society was rejected in the form of opposing “human nature,” and the revolutionary movement was given a moralistic basis. This is the “humanism” that Feuerbach fundamentally inherited.

The historical materialism of Marx rejected this idealistic theory of society, and emphasized that human society is something with a principled and necessary development, historically passing through various stages of production, its production relations being ultimately restricted by the forces of production, and culture and ideology within society being the reflection of these production relations. In this way, for the first time the movement seeking the ideal human society could connect itself to the cognition of principled development of actual society, rather than to some fantasy or belief. This means that the revolutionary change of human society is position on the understanding of the necessary development of history and must be undertaken by the masses themselves who are the bearers of production within society.  This view is a fundamental departure from the 18th century materialists who pinned their hopes on revolutionary change on “enlightened monarchs.”

Divide Between Materialism and Idealism

“We invariably discerned two principal alignments, two fundamental trends in the solution of philosophical problems. Whether nature, matter, the physical, the external world be taken as primary, and mind, spirit, sensation (experience -- as the widespread terminology of our time has it), the physical, etc., be regarded as secondary -- that is the root question which in fact continues to divide the philosophers into two great camps.” (Materialism and Emperio-Criticism, International Publishers, p. 348.)

Regarding the question of whether matter or mind should be considered fundamental, materialists clearly stand on the side of matter, and on this point are opposed to all philosophical idealists. There have been numerous debates between different tendencies in the history of philosophy, but ultimately the most fundamental difference has been between materialism and idealism. How to resolve the problem of the relationship between matter/the outside world/mind thought? Which is of the two is primary? Can mind ultimately be understood as being a reflection of matter and the outside world?  -- These are the problems that “split philosophers into two great camps” (Engels). In his debate with the Machists -- idealistic philosophers of the time -- Lenin repeatedly emphasized that human cognition is the “reflection” or “copy” of the outside world.

The basic question posed here is related to the foundation of epistemology, the source of cognition. Some have criticized Lenin for not going beyond the level of [18th century] French materialism, arguing that he is only saying that matter is primary and mind secondary, that mind is ultimately a reflection of the outside world -- i.e. nature and society -- which was already accomplished by French materialism. His view has been criticized as a “mirror-reflection theory” or “objectivism.” However, this is an extremely vulgar view that misses the point. The fundamental premise of materialism that ideas are the reflection of objects of cognition has significance when compared to the fundamental premise of idealism according to which nature and the outside world stem from the absolute spirit or “subjectivity,” or the material thing is seen as the “composite of sensation or the construct of concepts. For this reason Lenin said: “Of course, even the antithesis of matter and mind has absolute significance only within the bounds of a very limited filed -- in this case exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is indubitable.” (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism p. 147) Lenin later said: “The difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional.” (Philosophical Notes, Collected Works vol. 38 p. 114)

On the Theory of Reflection

“It is logical to assert that all matter possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection.” (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism p. 88)

Matter, in general, possesses the character of reflection or reciprocity -- that is, a faculty is similar to sensation. This character of reflection, can be seen in lower forms of matter, and appears clearly in the case of higher forms of matter called living organisms. Human sensation and knowledge as well is the reciprocal action between human beings and the human brain and the outside world. The cognitive function and movement of the mind is the operation or movement of the brain, which is the organization of matter developed to its highest point (containing billions of cells). Human sensation and consciousness is the reflection of the outside world, but this functions through the brain as the function of organizing matter. This character of reflection within the brain is the highest development of the character of reflection of matter in general.

Of course, the view that matter in general has a capability resembling sensation has no relation to animism or life theory [seimeiron]. The religious group Sogakukai, has tried to revise the old animist idea that “the universe itself is alive” or that “everything is alive.” This view in fact only seeks to justify religion and idealism by means of mystifying both organisms which are the highest development of nature (= matter) and the phenomenon of life as a certain organizational form of matter.

Philosophical Concept of Matter

“The Machians contemptuously shrug their shoulders at the ‘antiquated’ views of the ‘dogmatists,’ the materialists, who still cling to the concept matter, which supposedly has been refuted by ‘recent science’ and ‘recent positivism.’ We shall speak separately of the new theories of physics on the structure of matter. But it is absolutely unpardonable to confound, as the Machians do, any particular theory of the structure of matter with the epistemological category, to confound the problem of the new properties of new aspects of matter (electrons, for example) with the old problem of the theory of knowledge, with the problem of the sources of our knowledge, the existence of objective truth, etc…Matter is a philosophical category designating the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of the them.” (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p. 128)

Here Lenin is first of all making a distinction between the “philosophical category of matter” and the natural-scientific category.  The natural-scientific category of matter is the concept of the physical properties of matter, and changes when physics progresses and takes on a new form. For example, nuclear physics today, the atom consists of elementary particles such as electrons, protons, mesons, neutrons, photons, and neutrinos, but even this is still not the ultimate representation of matter. Nature is limitless and can never be definitively grasped. On the other hand, matter as a philosophical category is synonymous with objective existence, and signifies an actuality that exists independent of consciousness.

However, the new discoveries in the realm of physics, particularly the discovery of the electron and the radioactivity atom at the end of the 19th century, through physicists into confusion leading some to refer to the “disappearance of matter.” As a result, subsequently, the apprehension arose that God would take the place of matter. The Machists took advantage of this “crisis of physics,” to blur the epistemological division of materialism and idealism, and launch an attack on materialism. However: “Materialism and idealism differ in their respective answers to the question of the source of our knowledge and of the relation of knowledge (and of the ‘physical’ in general) to the physical world; while the question of the structure of matter, of atoms and electrons, is a question that concerns only this ‘physical world.’” (Ibid. p. 266) And the “disappearance of matter” does not in fact mean that “matter is disappearing, “ but rather only reveals the processes of deepening human understanding of matter and the relativity of these processes. This deepening and enrichment of the knowledge of matter is “another corroboration of dialectical materialism.” (Ibid. p. 268) The sole quality of matter within dialectical materialism -- and this is the connection to philosophical materialism -- is the quality of being an objective existence, that is, the nature of existing outside of our consciousness.

On the Roots of Religion

“In modern capitalist countries these roots are mainly social. The deepest root of religion today is the socially downtrodden condition of the working masses and their apparently complete helplessness in face of the blind forces of capitalism, which every day and every hour inflicts upon ordinary working people the most horrible suffering and the most savage torment, a thousand times more severe than those inflicted by extraordinary events, such as wars, earthquakes, etc. ‘Fear made the gods.’ Fear of the blind force of capital -- blind because it cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people -- a force which at every step in the life of the proletariat and small proprietor threatens to inflict, and does inflict ‘sudden,’ ‘unexpected,’ ‘accidental’ ruin, destruction, pauperism, prostitution, death from starvation -- such is the root of modern religion which the materialist must bear in mind first and foremost, if he does not want to remain an infant school materialist.” (“The Attitude of the Workers’ Party to Religion,” Collected Works vol. 15, pp. 405-6)

This is a passage that discusses how to fight religion. In order to combat religion correctly, it is first necessary to materialistically explain the source of religious belief. Why is it that among a wide stratum of the petty bourgeoisie and backward workers religion lives on, or has even experiences a revival (such as the postwar Sogakukai religious organization in Japan)? Bourgeois progressives would argue that this is due to the ignorance of the people, and advocate bourgeois culture and enlightenment, i.e. the practice of limiting the struggle against religion to the level of an ideological debate. 

The basis of modern religion, however, is in fact something social -- the feeling of impotence before the blind force of capital. Marxists, therefore, are not content to only lecture about religion, but rather insist on linking this to the movement to remove the foundation of religion, i.e. the concrete praxis of the class movement for socialism. It is necessary to thoroughly carry out educational activities and propagate atheism, but this activity must be subordinated to the task of developing the class struggle. 

Epistemological Basis of Idealism

“Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectlinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrifaction, subjectivism and subjective blindness -- voila the epistemological roots of idealism.  And clerical obscurantism (=philosophical idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge.” (On the Question of Dialectics, Collected Works vol. 38, p. 363)

Lenin here is opposing the “crude, simplistic, and metaphysical materialism” that views “philosophical idealism” simply as nonsense. Idealism is certainly a “sterile flower” that must be rejected, but “it is not groundless.” To view idealism solely as a “sterile flower” would be to mystify it, turning it into something incomprehensible. Rather, idealism is a “sterile flower” that grows on the living tree of limitlessly rich and fertile human knowledge.” Idealism is formed by isolating one aspect of the process of profound human cognition, then hardening and one-dimensionally magnifying this aspect.

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