Lenin's gOwn Wordsh(Part Three: Philosophy and Worldview)
8. On Dialectics
The Core of Dialectics
gThe splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory
parts is the essence (one of the eessentials,f one of the principal,
if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics. That
is precisely how Hegel, too, puts the mattercThe identity of opposites
(it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their eunity,f -- although
the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly
important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition
(discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in a phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
eself-movement,f in their spontaneous development, in their real life,
is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the estrugglef
of oppositescThe unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites
is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually
exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.h
(gOn the Question of Dialectics,h Collected Works vol. 38, p. 359-60)
Drawing on Hegel who saw the essence of dialectical thought as the grasping
of two opposing moments in their identity (unity),h Lenin also saw the
core of dialectics as the identity (unity) of opposites. Dialectics has
been called gnothing more than the science of the general laws of motion
and development of nature, human society and thought. (Engels, Anti-Duhring) Lenin, of course, did not disagree with this definition. However, following
Hegel, as well as considering the ancient tradition of dialectics, Lenin
sought the core of dialectics in the gunity of opposites.h
This gunity of oppositesh is not merely metaphysical harmony or the logic
of vulgar eclecticism. Rather, this raises the question of why it is possible
for something that is divided and contradictory to be united, under what
conditions this occurs, and why a thing can have unity even while being
reciprocally transformed. Take, for example, the basic human understanding
of the term gmy house.h The individual (my house) and the universal (house in general) are in opposition, but at the same time in unity. The individual
can only exist through the universal, just as the universal can only exist
through the individual. In this way we have an identity (unity) in opposites,
a reciprocal movement and transformation. In this way, dialectics can be
said to be a characteristic of human cognition.
Furthermore, this gunity in oppositesh includes the internal development
of cognition, and is its motive force. The same can be said for nature.
This is not a gradual or circular type of development, but rather is a
development that includes the disappearance of the old thing and appearance
of something new, and is characterized by leaps, an interruption of gradualness,
and the transformation into opposite.
Dialectics as the Explanation of Development
gNowadays, the idea of development, of evolution, has penetrated the social
consciousness almost in its entirety, but by other ways, not through Hegelian
philosophy. But as formulated by Marx and Engels basing themselves on Hegel,
this idea is far more comprehensive, far richer in content than the current
idea of evolution. A development that seemingly repeats the stages already
passed, but repeats them differently, on a higher basis (gnegation of
negationh), a development, so to speak, in a spiral, not in a straight
line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; einterruptions
of gradualnessf; the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses
to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various
forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon
(history constantly discloses ever new sides), a connection that provides
a uniform, law-governed, universal process of motion -- such are some of
the features of dialectics as a richer (than the ordinary) doctrine of
development. (On Marx and Engels, Foreign Language Press, pp. 12-13)
Dialectics if the principle of ultimate development -- gIt reveals the
transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure
before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away,
of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.h (Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach) Today the philosophy that nature and society are forever developing and
moving has entered the social consciousness and been generally accepted
-- albeit in a vulgarized form -- but this philosophy was not the possession
of humanity from the outset. During the Christian dominated middle ages,
the world was seen as an unchanging system in which everything was created
by God. During the period from the 15th to 18th century -- when capitalism
had emerged but not yet fully developed and science and productive power
were still at a low level -- the dominant philosophical method, which Hegel
called metaphysics, took gobjects of investigation [as] fixed, rigid,
given once for all.h (Engels, Anti-Duhring) In this period a mechanical worldview was dominant, and the view
of the world as development and change was hidden in the shadows.
However, with the discovery of the cell, the law of energy transformation,
Darwinfs theory of evolution, etc., humanity was given an awareness of
development, and the concept arose of the interconnection and reciprocity
and interaction within nature. It was Hegel, above all others, who seriously
constructed a system of this philosophy of development, and it was Marx
and Engels, as well as Lenin, who connected this to materialism to give
it a truly rational appearance.
According to Lenin, there are gtwo basic conceptions of development (evolution).h
One is the bourgeois liberal view of evolution as being gradual and reformist,
while the other view sees evolution as a gleap,h in terms of the transformation
from quantity to quality. The former is a dead, ossified view of evolution,
while the latter gfurnishes the key to the eself-movementf of everything
existing.h (gOn the Question of Dialecticsh) The former is the worldview
of the bourgeoisie, while the latter is the worldview of the proletariat.
Dialectics of Cognition
gEssentially, Hegel is completely right as opposed to Kant. Thought proceeding from
the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct -- does not get
way from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, of
a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific
(correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply,
truly and completely. From living perception to abstract thought, and from
this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition
of truth, of the cognition of objective reality. Kant disparages knowledge
in order to make way for faith: Hegel exalts knowledge, asserting that
knowledge is the knowledge of God. The materialist exalts the knowledge
of matter, of nature, consigning God, and the philosophical rabble that
defends God, to the rubbish heap.h (Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works vol. 38, p. 171)
The consciousness of abstract and universal things is gfull of contradictions.h
In one aspect this is the more profound and correct reflection of nature
or society. The concept of value clearly contains a more correct understanding than the concept of price
of concrete commodity production relations. On the other hand, however,
something abstract is lifeless and gpure,h and still one-dimensional,
since it is only the first step towards a concrete, overall understanding.
Human beings cannot know a concrete thing immediately and all at once.
But through the limitless aggregation of abstract concepts and various
laws, humanity can ceaselessly draw closer to the complete figure of a
concrete thing.
Ultimately human cognition is also a perpetual process of movement. The
approach of thought to the object (in other words, cognition) is a process
of movement and development, and an unceasing process of the generation
of contradictions and their solution. Cognition is also necessarily penetrated
by dialectical laws.
Negation in Dialectics
gNot empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics,
-- which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its
most important element -- no, but negation as a moment of connection, as
a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations,
without any eclecticism.h (Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works vol. 38, p. 225)
Dialectics is the logic of negation. But, as Hegel pointed out, this negation
is not an extrinsic negative action that is alien to the thing negated.
Engels compared this negation to the example of barley. If the grains of
barley are crushed and then consumed they are thereby gnegatedh -- that
is, the barleyfs existence as a grain is ended. On the other hand, however,
if a grain of barley is instead planted within the soil, it can germinate
and grow so that the grain is in turn gnegatedh by the plant. In the
first case, the negation of the grain is its simple annihilation, not its
negation as a moment of development, and this is gemptyh or gfutileh
negation, or a nonsensical and arbitrary negation. Only the second negation
is a dialectical negation.
The logic of this dialectical negation has extremely important practical
significance. For instance, out of the Russian Revolution sprang a movement
of so-called gproletarian culture.h This emerged as the anti-thesis to
the aristocratic and bourgeois culture of the former class society, but
-- as witnessed by the slogan gBurn Raphaelh -- this was a simple negation
of class culture, and a movement whose essence was the negation of anarchy.
Lenin was critical of those gultra-leftistsh who sought the negation
of past culture in terms of eliminating it completely, pointing out that
gMarxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary
proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements
of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned
everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development
of human thought and culture.h (gOn Proletarian Culture,h Collected
Works vol. 31, p. 317) Indeed, the dialectical manner of negation is the
only truly revolutionary means of negating reality.
Dialectics vs. Sophistry and Eclecticism
gSince everything has emehreref -- eInhaltsbestimmungen, Verhaltnisse
und Rucksichten,f [emultiplef -- econtent determinations, relations
and considerationsf] so any number of arguments can be put forward. This
is what Socrates and Plato called sophistry. Such arguments do not contain
ethe whole extent of the thing,f they do not eexhaustf it (in the sense
of econstituting its connectionsf and econtaining allf its sides).h
(Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works vol. 38, p. 146)
Here Lenin discusses the meaning of sophistry. Every thing has many determinations.
For example, a strike can be viewed as part of the development of the class
struggle of the workers, or seen as a minus for workers if it is expected
to be suppressed, or in other cases as a gchallenge.h Even the same strike
has multiple gcontent-determinations, relations and considerations.h
For this reason, any number of arguments for or against a strike can be
devised. Since any strike can have the ghinth of a challenge or the gfearh
of reprisal, this can be employed as a reason to oppose a strike. The JCP
used such a reason to oppose the general strike of April 17, 1946. Of course,
to ignore the question of the gwhole extent of the thingh in terms of
the development of the class struggle, and just look at one aspect of the
strike, is nothing but the logic of sophistry.
Moreover, the so-called anti-JCP gnew lefth also has many gcontent determinations.h
They have been viewed as believers in Trotsky, as gtoolsh of bourgeois
state power, as being financed by some rightwing elements, or as advocates
of violence who are fighting against bourgeois state power. To not give
serious consideration to the matter and grasp the necessary content and
connections of the new left, taking instead one element separated from
the whole -- for example to aruge that they since they call for the goverthrowh
of the JCP they are no different from the LDP and reactionaries, and can
thus be called counter-revolutionaries -- would be an example of the reasoning
of a sophist. The new left ideologue Kuroda Kanfichi has declared that
the philosophical basis for the Stalinist Communist Party is gobjectivism,h
but the most salient characteristic of the logic of the Communist Party
today is fact it is the abandonment of dialectics and embracing of sophistry
(dogmatism and metaphysics -- i.e. the reverting back to pre-Hegelian stage).
Lenin used the term eclecticism to refer to arbitrarily taking some aspects
of a thing and randomly joining them together, or the standpoint of reconciling
two or more different things that have been placed parallel to each other.
He emphasized that gif we are to have a true knowledge of an object we
must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and emediacies.fh
(gOnce Again on the Trade Unionsh Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 94). In terms of appearance, dialects may resemble eclecticism and sophistry, but they are essentially
different and in opposition. As Lenin points out: gAll-sided, universal
flexibility of concepts, a flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites,
-- that is the essence of the matter. This flexibility, applied subjectively
= eclecticism and sophistry. Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e., reflecting
the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics,
is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.h (Philosophical Notebooks, p. 110)
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