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Rosa Luxemburg and the National Problem:
The Similarity of Luxemburg’s Theory
to “Austrian Marxism”
Writen by Hiroyoshi Hayashi (1993)
Translated by Roy West
7. Luxemburg’s Concept of Nation
At the basis of Luxemburg’s national policy, is a particular?extremely
bourgeois liberalist?conception of the nation. We need to reveal this here!
She is not unaware of the fact that capitalism is first of all an “economic
phenomena.” However, she quickly adds that, “[i]n this way capitalism
creates a whole new culture,” (p. 252) and explains the significance of
capitalism, and therefore the nation, form exclusively from this dimension.
For her, the nation is the birth and development of the national spirit,
and this becomes possible through the formation of the urban or “professional”
intelligentsia. This typical view of Luxemburg has a nonsensical content:
In this way capitalism creates a whole new culture: public education, development
of science, the flowering of learning, journalism, a specifically geared
art. However, these are not just mechanical appendages to the bare process
of production or mechanically separated lifeless parts. The culture of
bourgeois society itself constitutes a living and to some extent autonomous
entity. In order to exist or develop, this society not only needs certain
relationships of production, exchange, and communication, but it also creates
a certain set of intellectual relations within the framework of contradictory
class interests. If the class struggle is a natural product of the capitalist
economy then its natural needs are the conditions that make this class
struggle possible, hence not only modern political forms, democracy, parliamentarianism,
but also open public life, with an open exchange of views and conflicting
convictions, an intense intellectual life, which alone makes the struggle
of classes and parties possible. Popular education, journalism, science,
art-growing at first within the framework of capitalist production?become
in themselves an indispensable need and condition of existence of modern
society. Schools, libraries, newspapers, theaters, public lectures, public
discussions grow into normal conditions of life, into the indispensable
intellectual atmosphere of each member of the modern, particularly urban
society, even outside the connection of these phenomena with economic conditions.
In a word, the vulgar material process of capitalism creates a whole new
ideological “superstructure” with an existence and development which
are to some extent autonomous.
However, capitalism does not create that intellectual spirit in the air
or in the theoretical void of abstraction, but in a definite territory,
a definite social environment, a definite language, within the framework
of certain traditions, in a word, within definite national forms. Consequently,
by that very culture it sets apart a certain territory and a certain population
as a cultural national entity in which it creates a special, closer cohesion
and connection intellectual interests. (pp. 252-3)
What is she trying to say here, exactly? What is this if not a beautification
or ode to bourgeois culture and “spiritual activities”?
Luxemburg clearly reduces the conditions for the “struggle of classes
and parties” to not only democracy as a political system, but also to
“open public life, with an open exchange of views and conflicting convictions,
an intense public life.” Any Marxist would recognize that the objective,
material basis for the “struggle between classes and political parties”
is the capitalistic production relations, and that under capitalism the
realization of democracy is the political condition that makes the open
and large-scale development of this possible. But Luxemburg is not saying
this. She has already gone so far as to praise all of the “cultural activities”
of bourgeois liberalism. She introduces the typical conventionalities of
bourgeois intellectuals, i.e. the “liberal spiritual culture,” as a condition
for class struggle. She adds that spiritual activity can only exist in
the national form, and for this reason the spiritual cultural activity
of the nation is of decisive importance to the class struggle. Therefore,
this “national culture” should be preserved and protected by national
self-governments.
Therefore, for Luxemburg “national cultural autonomy” is a completely
apolitical thing. This is something that forms one part of the democratic
system of Russia, which does not challenge or replace this system. This
autonomy is something that is to only occur in Poland, which is located
within the Russian empire, and its jurisdiction is limited to the realm
of the “national culture.”
What is this program exactly? What class or segment interests does this
standpoint reflect or represent?
If the class struggle took place within the “national forms” then her
idea would be correct in a sense. The fact that the class struggle between
capital and wage labor fundamentally takes place within the specific boundaries
of the state is the inevitable outcome of the fact that capital organizes
its rule and power as a “state.” Luxemburg, however, says that the Polish
people, i.e. not only the bourgeoisie, but the workers as well, form part
of the Russian state and should be viewed in this way. On the other hand,
however, in the name of “national cultural autonomy,” she says that the
class struggle is fought out within the “form” of the Polish nation (its
“spiritual life”). This is fundamentally self-contradictory. Which is
the correct view, then? It is clear that the national differences in language
in themselves are not the cause of any national particularity from the
fact that no matter how different the language of a country, as capitalism
develops the same content of social struggle can be found in the society.
What Luxemburg is arguing is nonsense. This is the same sort of thing that
Mr. Sakai introduced in our inner-party debates.
But Luxemburg goes on to add that the problem is not simply one of language
differences:
The cultural and aesthetic values created by capitalism in a given environment
not only assume a certain national quality through the main organ of cultural
production, i.e., the language, but merge with the traditional culture
of society, whose history becomes saturated with its distinct cultural
characteristics; in a word, this culture turns into a national culture
with an existence and development of its own. The basic features and foundations
of modern culture in all bourgeois countries are common, international,
and the tendency of contemporary development is doubtless toward an ever
greater community of international culture. However, within the framework
of this highly cosmopolitan, bourgeois culture, French is clearly distinguished
from English culture, German from Dutch, Polish from Russian, as so many
separate types.
The borderlines of historical stages and the historical “seams” are least
detectable in the development of an “ideology”. Because the modern capitalist
culture is heir to and continuator of earlier cultures, what develops is
the continuity and monolithic quality of a national culture which, on the
surface, shows no connection with the period of capitalist economy and
rule. (p. 254)
Luxemburg thinks that since France, Germany, England and other countries
have their own particular “culture”, it is possible to abstract from
the commonalities of the bourgeois culture of each state. However, if we
examine the “modern culture” of these states, it becomes immediately
clear that within these particularities, they are full of profound commonalities.
It must be said that Luxemburg’s theory is typically like that of Sakai,
or vice versa, and that both are very close to the “theory of national
cultural autonomy” of the Austrian Marxists. Like Rosa, Sakai also talks
about national distinctions, and as evidence points to language, “culture”
and “spirit”! Sakai called us “Luxemburg-ists”, but this term in fact
describes himself, since his own theory fits perfectly with Luxemburg’s
theory of “national cultural autonomy”!
Of course, Luxemburg’s theoretical standpoint is contradictory. For example,
she raises the examples of academic research, art as well as publishing
and journalism, the newspaper is not have any “national” particularities
to speak of?any nation has or can have newspapers, and consequently it
is self-evident that the newspaper cannot be used as an example to justify
“national cultural autonomy”. Or would Rosa (or Sakai) obstinately insist
that newspapers or journalism have “national particularities”? Certainly,
the newspapers in France, England and Japan are not exactly the same, and
there are probably some differences between them. But doesn’t this merely
expose the ridiculousness of the theory of “national cultural autonomy”?
The fact that a newspaper is published in some different form or another,
or that journalism exists in different forms depending on the nation, is
obviously not an essential question as far as class struggle is concerned.
Luxemburg insists that “modern intellectual culture,” like bourgeois
democracy is “twofold” or “double-edged” phenomenon. In other words,
democracy is both the form of bourgeois rule and also “so many means for
the rise of the proletariat as a class to the struggle for emancipation,
for the abolition of bourgeois rule.” (p. 257) For example, she considers
the example of school education, and points out that this is a necessary
means for bourgeois society to create necessary labor power, but when the
proletarian becomes the revolutionary class, it can also become a “lever
of class struggle.” Luxemburg goes on to talk about social science, historical
science, and philosophy. However, the working class does not seek its emancipatory
thought or logic from bourgeois philosophy, economics or culture in general
(and this would be impossible anyway). It is completely careless to think
that the workers class struggles can be connected to bourgeois culture
in whatever form, and this ultimately leads to the beautification of bourgeois
culture.
We can certainly not agree with the following view of Luxemburg.
Capitalism annihilated Polish national independence but at the same time
created modern Polish national culture. This national culture is a product
indispensable within the framework of bourgeois Poland; its existence and
development are a historical necessity, connected with the capitalistic
development itself. The development of capitalism, which chained Poland
to Russia by socioeconomic ties, undermined Russian absolutism, united
and revolutionarized the Russian and Polish proletariat as a class called
upon to overthrown absolutism, and in this way created, under the Tsars,
the indispensable preconditions for achieving political freedom. But within
the framework and against the background of this general tendency toward
the democratization of the state, capitalism at the same time knit more
closely the socioeconomic and cultural-national life of the Polish kingdom,
thus preparing the objective conditions for the realization of Polish national
autonomy.
As we have seen, the requirements of the capitalist system lead with historic
in all modern states to the development of local self-government through
the participation of the people in carrying out sociopolitical functions
on all levels, from the commune to the district to the province. Where,
however, inside a modern state there exist distinct nationality districts
constituting at the same time territories with certain economic and social
distinctions, the same requirements of the bourgeois economy make self-government
on the highest, country-wide level, indispensable. On this level, local
self-government is also transformed, as a result of a new factor, national-cultural
distinctness, into a special type of democratic institutions applicable
only in quite specific conditions. (p. 255-6)
She says that capitalism annihilated “Polish national independence”,
but at the same time gave birth to the possibility of “national cultural
autonomy”. However, here it is not clear how “national independence”
and “national self-government” are different or whether they are the
same thing. Luxemburg is certainly unable to rationally explain the difference
between the two (at least in a satisfactory form). If capitalism in Poland
would annihilate the “national cultural autonomy” of Poland, why couldn’t
it be said that it would also extinguish “national cultural autonomy”?
Aren’t both of them essentially the same historical social demand which
emerges along with the development of capitalism? Luxemburg says that “national
independence” is impossible and incorrect, but that “national cultural
autonomy” is not only possible, but necessary and desirable. What is the
difference between the two? If it were possible for “self-government”
within the framework of the Russian state, and only this were important,
wouldn’t this amount to closing one’s eyes to Russia’s oppression of
Poland? If there were no Russian exploitation of the Polish nation?or essentially
none?why would Luxemburg call for “national autonomy” and think it necessary.
Seen from any angle, Luxemburg’s view is confused and incomprehensible.
Is she trying to say that national self-determination under capitalism
is impossible, but national autonomy is possible because the former is
a political or economic problem whereas the latter is a cultural or spiritual
one? If for a “nation” or “race” political independence has already
essentially lost its significance, this would mean that the bourgeois democratic
state had already fundamentally solved the national problem, relegating
it forever to the past. And if a country has solved the national problem,
why would the right of national self-determination still need to be defended.
But how is cultural national autonomy possible without political autonomy?
If political independence had already lost its essential significance for
a “nation,” wouldn’t this mean that a bourgeois democratic state had
already fundamentally solved the national problem, and that this fundamental
problem was already forever in the past? And if a state has not solved
the national problem, shouldn’t the right of self-determination still
be able to be defended. Just as it is nonsense to deny the right of self-determination
if the national problem has not been solved, after it has been essentially
solved it is reactionary to speak of such things as “national cultural
autonomy.” In the case of the latter, the task that needs to be raised
firmly and clearly is the class task of the workers of all “nations”
and “rations” uniting and advancing the class struggle to overthrow the
rule of capital?not the national tasks!
However, some may argue that Luxemburg’s position is justified since she
called for the Polish workers to fight together with the workers throughout
Russia and rise up against Czarism. That is, she thought that although
the Polish bourgeoisie sought national independence, this was an irrelevant
or unessential problem for the workers in Poland. Instead, Luxemburg thought
that the Polish working class should unite with the working class in the
Russian empire and advance together towards the overthrow of Czarism, and
then the overthrow of the bourgeoisie throughout the empire. Isn’t this
a position faithful to the internationalist standpoint of the proletariat??It
is easy to be instinctively drawn to Luxemburg’s position.
Of course, it cannot be said that Luxemburg necessarily was wrong on this
point. Her mistake lies not so much in not support the slogan of the right
of self-determination for Poland’s workers, as in her opposition to this
as a slogan or part of the program of the Russian Social Democratic Party;
i.e. in terms of generally opposing this slogan. We cannot deny that in
the case of workers belonging to an oppressed nation, there may be cases
where they don’t raise the slogan of self-determination (especially in
the case when it is being advocated by nationalistic bourgeois parties).
There is not space here to examine whether Poland at the time was one of
these cases. But Luxemburg’s mistake in going so far as to deny this as
one part of the program of the Russian Social Democratic Party should be
clear. Moreover, Luxemburg went even further and denied national self-determination
in Poland on the grounds of being generally impossible, thereby deepening
her own dogmatic standpoint and ending up in a theoretical and practical
blind alley. No excuse is possible for this sort of “mistake” by Luxemburg.
Rosa Luxemburg and the National Problem: Contents
- Introduction
- The Abstract Denial of Nationalism
- Are the National Tasks Bourgeois Tasks?
- The Theory of the “Nation-State” and the Class Interests of the Workers
- The “National Self-Determination” of Poland
- Centralized Power and Regional Autonomy
- Luxemburg’s Concept of Nation
- Luxemburg Begins to “Select” or Screen Nations
- National Cultural Autonomy and National Self-Determination
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